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THE LAW OF SENTENCING AS PUBLIC CEREMONY'
JOSEPH W. LrrI=*
INTRODUCTION

The law of sentencing criminals is a mess. By this I mean merely that the
law is not serving its intended functions.1 The very processes by which individual sentences are imposed are in disarray. In fact, there is no agreement
as to what the goals of sentencing ought to be and precious little attention is
given to designing a sentencing process to best reflect intended goals, what2
ever they are.
This article does not purport to prescribe what the sentencing goals ought
to be. I am not persuaded that any particular goal or group of goals is inherently more sound or just than others; thus, I believe that choices may
legitimately be made among them. Whatever the goals may be, however, they
ought to be clearly expressed by the state's basic policy-making entity, which
I deem to be the legislature. The job of setting particular sentences ought to
be given to agencies designed and equipped to make decisions reflecting the
intended goals. Finally, the legislature ought to promulgate a statement
assuring that any inherent conflicts among the various goals are regularly resolved in accordance with agreed to rules of priority.
Another major shortcoming in the sentencing process, beyond the lack of
definition and specification of goals, is estrangement from influence by what
I will refer to as the interests and values of the community. The body politic
has little awareness of the sentencing process and, not incidentally, what goes
on in prisons. As a consequence, public opinion has less influence upon sentencing than it should have. This separation has grown wider through time,
primarily as a result of the manner in which well-intentioned sentencing reforms have been effectuated. To reverse this, we need to adopt a sentencing
model that appropriately integrates community interests and values.
I will first briefly describe the caimed goals of criminal sanctioning. Particular attention will be given to how certain changes have brought an estrangement between the people and the corrections process. Next, current reform proposals are described and analyzed. Finally, the goal of opening up
sentencing to public awareness and influence is examined in detail.
*Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.S., 1957, Duke University; M.S., 1961, Worcester
Polytechnical Institute; J.D., 1963, University of Michigan.
1.

See infra notes 38-64 and accompanying text.

2. This is an overstatement because a great amount of writing focuses on bits and
pieces of the process. Yet, it appears no one has addressed the entire process from the point
of view expressed herein.
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MODERN GOALS OF SENTENCING

Most modern writers ascribe one or more of four goals to criminal
corrections: to make law abiding citizens of former offenders (specific deterrence); to dissuade would be offenders by making an example of them
(general deterrence); to better offenders by curing them of their criminal ways
(rehabilitation); and, to punish offenders (vindication or retribution). 3 Other
3.

See generally M.

FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER

106 (1972). Legal

scholarship about a half-century ago suggested that these goals had by then become well
integrated into the thought of the legal system. See Strahorn, Criminology and the Law of
Guilt, 84 U. PA. L. REv. 491, 600 (pts. 1 & 2) (1936). The author argues that the three main
goals of sentencing correspond to the substantive elements of criminality in Anglo-American
law. He maintains these elements included: social damage; that is, the criminal result or the
corpus delicti; the defendant's creation of this damage, sometimes called the act, but more
accurately termed the causation or socially dangerous conduct; and the offender's anti-social
tendency, likelihood of recidivism, mens rea, or so-called criminal intent. Id. at 492. Strahorn
ventured so far as to say, "[i]f any one [of these elements] be missing, there is no guilt."
Id. at 493.
Strahorn ties these elements into the goal of criminal sentencing. First, the requirement
of corpus delicti ties the crime to social disapproval of the act. Doing the act transgresses the
line society draws to protect itself, entitling society to revenge. Strahorn considers this a
backward-looking response, for the purpose of righting the imbalance of rights and wrongs
created by the offender's act.
Second, the requirement of causation or socially dangerous conduct ties into general
deterrence. It would not be right to punish someone if harm occurred innocently; rather,
the harm must be tied to behavior creating the risk of the corpus delicti. Causation is a sine
qua non element of criminality and is appropriately countered by the general goal of preventing recurrence of dangerous behavior. The second element of criminality is forward
looking; it seeks to avoid harm in the future.
The third element is also forward looking. Strahorn's inclusion of recidivism or mens rea
or criminal intent as a substantive element of criminality connotes that punishment is unjust
in the absence of a culpable mind. For example, punishing a man who causes harm while
sleepwalking is unjustified. This element also has its sentencing counterpart, reformation.
Presumably, if there is no chance the offender will repeat the same act, there would be no
criminality under Strahorn's analysis.
Not everyone agrees with this. Professor Norval Morris said that a wife slayer who could
never be expected to kill again "cannot, as a routine matter, be put on probation or given
a suspended sentence," because the criminal law "acts as a moral teacher, and consequently
requires a retributive floor to punishment...." Morris, The Future of Imprisonment:
Toward a Punitive Philosophy, 72 Micir. L. Rav. 1161, 1175 (1974). The United States Supreme Court in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952) stated:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention
is no provincial or transient notion ....
A relation between some mental element and
punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory
"But I didn't mean to," and has afforded the rational bases for a tardy and unfinished
substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the
motivation for public prosecution.
This idea has led some state courts to veer away from approval of strict liability crimes. See,
e.g., State v. Brown, 389 So. 2d 48 (La. 1980).
The apparent disagreement between Strahorn and Morris on this point is illusory. Morris
is speaking about the punishment to be meted out. He maintains that a convicted wife slayer
cannot be let off scot free. In contrast, Strahorn is speaking to the question of guilt. Thus,
he is in effect predicting what a jury of peers would do when persuaded there is no likelihood
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goals occasionally mentioned are to exploit the energies of offenders for productive works and to disgorge reparations from them to benefit crime victims.
Retribution and reparation are backward-looking goals and as such are
categorically different from the others. The rationale for reparation is simply
to return the victim to the economic status he occupied before the crime. This
has the ring of common sense and justice, easily comprehended by the common
man and inoffensive to behavioral theorists. By contrast, although retribution
is inherently understandable to most people, it is difficult to explain in behavioral theory. Perhaps the best thing said for it is that it restores balance on
an imaginary tote board of social rights and wrongs. Retribution does nothing
for the offender and is rejected by many thinkers who believe their thought
reflects a more civilized state.6 Despite that, retribution is having a modem
comeback.
By contrast to retribution and reparation, specific and general deterrence
and rehabilitation are forward-looking goals. Although their specific purpose
is to prevent future crime, they also reflect the general goal of minimizing
human suffering. Together these permit the conclusion that inflicting punishment upon an offender is justified so long as greater pain is avoided. This
utilitarian approach to punishment, stemming from the thought of Hobbes,
Bentham, John Stuart Mill and others,7 had its heyday in the latter part of
the nineteenth century and most of the present century.
the offender will repeat the act in question. Strahorn's view clearly must not be taken as an
absolute, else his whole theory would be felled by a single erratic decision, but as a prediction
of what to expect in the great mass of cases. Although his prediction is correct in that
sense, it cannot and need not be proved. The significant point to be drawn is the implied
assumption that juries employ notions of retribution, deterrence and recidivism in passing
on guilt and innocence.
4. Sellin, Corrections in Historical Perspective, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 585, 589
(1958). See also Slave Labor, in Tnm PRISON ExPmRIucE 98-106 (K. Weiss ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Slave Labor].
5. Various victim compensation proposals are discussed in R. MEINERS, VIarIr COMPENSATMON(1978). Most of these proposals do not rely upon restitution from the criminals, which
Meiners states was the pre-state secular punishment of crime, but by taxation. Id. at 98. See
also B. GALAWAY &c
J. HUDSON, OFFENDER RESTITUTION IN THEORY AND ACTION (1978); Ohlin &
Remngon, Sentencing Structure: Its Effect Upon Systems for the Administration of Criminal
Justice, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS 495, 498 (1958). Among the statutes permitting a judge to
order restitution is OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 991(a) (West Supp. 1981-1982): "In sentencing
a person convicted of a crime, the court shall first consider a restitution program for the
victim as well as imposition of a fine or incarceration of the offender."
6. The rejection of retribution as an appropriate goal of corrections perhaps stands on
many footings. One is the utilitarian notion of minimizing pain, which incorporates Bentham's
injunction that punishment qua punishment is "mischief." See infra note 10. Another is the
notion that society has some sort of mission to "better" criminals for the sake of betterment.
This was espoused in 1870, as follows: "[S]ince such treatment [of criminals] is directed to
the criminal rather than to the crime, its great object should be his moral regeneration.
Since the supreme aim of prison discipline is the reformation of criminals, not the infliction
of vindictive suffering." J. STUTSmAN, CuniNr THE CrfiNAL 18-19 (1926). See infra notes 22-27
and accompanying text.
7. Utilitarian theory would administer just enough punishment so that the amount of
human suffering caused by the last unit administered would prevent slightly more suffering
by the harm it saved through incapacitation, deterrence and rehabilitation. See Rawls,
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The evolution of sentencing goals has been traced from antiquity8 through
modern timesY In examining the literature, I was struck by how markedly
stated sentencing goals have changed in the course of a century. As our culture
has become more "civilized," the tendency has been to pretend to "cure"
offenders rather than punish them. Even more striking was the change in
process; notably, the almost total elimination of public participation in the
assignment and execution of punishment by secreting them away from the
public eye. A chasm of remoteness has opened between the people and the
agencies exercising the authority to impose sentences. This estrangement
between the public and the corrections authorities has, somewhat perversely,
grown incrementally with each new hue and cry to get tough on criminals.
When things go awry, the public has called for more of what has been done,
believing that more would be better, without lifting the curtain that screens
corrections from public view to look more carefully at exactly what is going
wrong. Thus, as modem goals have evolved, the practice has become more
secretive.

The Decline of Sentencing as Ceremony
I will trace the history of these movements in broad strokes. According to
Heinrich Oppenheimer, an early twentieth century scholar, punishment's
true social goal has always been utilitarian, not in the sense of parceling out
the exact amount of punishment to prevent additional crimes, but to soothe
the wrath of the gods by atoning for the wrongs of sinners.1° Social punishment
Punishment as a Practice, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 83, 87 (J. Murphy ed. 1973),
wherein the author refers to Hobbes, Hume, Bentham, J. S. Mill and Sedgwick as the "classical"
utilitarians. Perhaps Cesare Beccaria was the founding father of utilitarianism as humane
corrections policy. According to N. Morris, the best summary of his policy is his own statement: "In order for a punishment not to be an act of violence of one or of many against a
private citizen, it ought to be public, prompt, necessary, the minimum possible in the given
circumstances, proportionate to the crime, dictated by the laws." Morris, Foreword to M.
MAESTRO, CESARE BECCARIA at vii-viii (1973).
8. See H. OPPENHEIMER, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 138-52 (1913). See also W.
ANDREWS, OLD TIME PUNISHMENTS (1890) (colorfully describes English punishments from
the Middle Ages up through the end of the nineteenth century); Sellin, supra note 4, at 585
(historical development of punishment).
9. Lindsey, Historical Sketch of the Indeterminate Sentence and Parole System, 16 J. OF
CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCL 9 (1925). Lindsey undertook an encyclopedic review of the
origins of indeterminate sentencing and parole and traced the beginnings of parole to an
1817 New York statute permitting early release for good behavior. Id. at 10. The first
indeterminate sentence law is traced to Michigan in 1869. Id. at 18. See also Dershowitz, Background Paper, in

FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH

CENTURY FUND

TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING 93-106 (1976) (briefly covers some of the same ground and
brings it up to date to include modern criticisms).

10.

H. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 8, at 138-52. In tracing the religious roots of social punish-

ment, Oppenheimer found its ancient basis in the perceived need to atone for sins committed
by the people against the will of the gods. Thus, punishment wiped the slate clean in the
eyes of the deity. Modern retributionists look to Emmanuel Kant for a philosophical rather
than religious underpinning for the theory. See also F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE
16 (1973) [hereinafter cited as F. ZIMRING]. Zimring and Hawkins put the differing views of the

retributionists and utilitarians in stark contrast when they juxtaposed Kant's injunction to
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in olden times was a form of religious self-defense, and harsh punishments
were more palliative than mild ones. Retribution was not an isolated secular
motive. Indeed, the old testament's eye-for-an-eye lex talionis was very much in
evidence, but as a private, or civil matter, rather than a public, or criminal one.
In ancient times the selection of an appropriate punishment was never
much of an issue. It was either death, severe physical abuse, or banishment.",
The definition of a crime and the specification of a penalty were historically
the product of the same action, and, hence, of the same law-setting agency.
Only the determination of guilt or innocence was separate. The public jury
had no part in prescribing the sentence; not because it lacked capacity, but
because the job had already been done. The sentence was predetermined not
to satisfy the people or to protect them from similar wrongs, but to quiet the
gods. Over time, the perception of punishment shifted from religious to secular
purposes,' 2 but the job of specifying punishments stayed with the legislators.
Ancient sentences were executed in public even when the sentence was
death. Public executions were common in England until May 26, 1868. On that
date, one Michael Barrett had the dubious distinction of being the last victim
of public execution in England when he was hanged at Newgate.1s When
Thomas Wells dropped from the gallows at Maidston on August 13, 1868,14
he became the first man to be hanged in an English prison. Thus, Barrett's
neck was not the last stretched under law; instead, the hanging merely moved
indoors to the secrecy of the prisons. Before the gallows were taken indoors, the
landscape had been festooned with gibbets, ducking stools and similar instruments of horror.15 The ritual did not end with the act of killing, because the
remains of the offenders were not always allowed to disappear in decent
burial. They were often beheaded, disemboweled, quartered and hanged up in
various public places and "so continueth till [the] bones come to nothing."' 6
In short, while the people may have had little role in the assignment of
penalties, they apparently had a complete right to be informed of the details
of the execution of penalties. The execution of sentence was a public ceremony.
execute all the murderers in the event society dissolves itself to Jeremy Bentham's view that
"all punishment is mischief, all punishment in itself is evil." Id. See Pugsley, Retributiism:
A Just Basis for CriminalSentences, 7 HOFsmrA L. REv. 379, 397-404 (1979).
11. Oppenheimer demonstrates that the ancient punishment was generally death. Id. at
92-102. Sometimes, for good measure, the offender's house was demolished and his chattels
destroyed. Id. at 97. In W. ANDRnws, supra note 8, the author points out that the English used
a number of quaint devices such as the pillory, the stocks, and others. Many were used to
help ascertain guilt or innocence. By far the most popular form of punishment was death by
one horrible means or another, including drowning, burning, boiling, beheading, pressing,
hanging, drawing and quartering, and others. Id.
12. By the time Stutsman was writing in 1926, the religious origins of punishment apparently evaded his eye altogether. He seemed unaware that he was shifting the ground
for social imposition of punishment when he said, "[t]he subject is important because none of
us is ever free from the danger of criminal attack.... Hundreds of years, at least, of vindictive
and deterrent punishment have fallen far short of a solution." J. STUTSmAN, supra note 6, at 4.
13. W. AN.DEws, supra note 8, at 223.
14. Id. at 219.
15. Id.'
16. Id. at 223.
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It may seem ironic to a person for whom the word "religion" connotes
compassion and forgiveness that shifting the social basis of punishment away
7
from religion and the expiation of sin to secular goals would see a shrinking
away from the death penalty, dismemberment, public humiliation and similar
brutalities. The key to the riddle is probably attributable to shifts in religious
thought over time. Humane notions began to assert themselves against the
18
continuation of "uncivilized" practices at the end of the eighteenth century.
Perhaps the absence of religious mandate made thinking people question
their fallibility in defining crimes and in extracting the ultimate sacrifice.
Thus, many degrading practices were officially ended; executions were moved
into prisons; and, the death penalty ultimately was abolished in most European
countries.' 9
Reformers were not satisfied with merely shielding the execution of offenders
from the sadistic gawking of the public. Instead, the goal was to eliminate or at
lease reduce the use of the death penalty, and to replace it with imprisonment.
Success in this lead inexorably to debate about the purpose of imprisonment.
The ancient reason to punish, to soothe the gods, did not translate to imprisonment. It thus became necessary to look for other justification and to
answer practical rather than religious questions. If people are to be jailed as
punishment, then we must specify for how long. Moreover, if it is valid to
ask "how long?" then it is also valid to ask, "What are we trying to achieve?"
Retribution is one reply, but we may also protect ourselves from crime through
incapacitation and deterrence, both of which balance the pain suffered by the
punished offenders against the societal gain of crimes not committed. The
move away from the death penalty made greater expression of utilitarian
theories possible.20

17. According to Oppenheimer, the initial secular goal was to keep the sovereign's peace.
The rise of sovereigns superseded the requirement to expiate the ethereal gods. H. OPPENH EIMR, supra note 8, at 173-74.
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 288 (1972), Justice Marshall presented a thumbnail history
of capital punishment in his concurring opinion. He reads history to see the initiation of
capital punishment as "private vengeance," but also saw its embrace by the state as initially
laden with "theocratic" overtones. Id. at 384-35 (Marshall, J., concurring). This is not inconsistent with Oppenheimer's thesis.
18. Andrews recounts an episode demonstrating how the open execution of punishment
can cause the more humane members of the community to seek reform. Two women were
hanged for passing forged notes, which they had unknowingly done at the connivance of the
forgers. The practice was initially stopped by the single expedient of stopping the printing
of one-pound notes. W. ANDREWS, supra note 8, at 218-21. Although Britain did not give up
the death penalty as did other Western European countries, only that country, France and
Spain continued it on the books as late as 1958. Sellin, supra note 4, at 585, 587.
19. France was the only major western European nation to continue the death penalty.
The socialist Mitterand government, elected in 1981 abolished it.
20. Rawls, supra note 7, at 87. It was also necessary to move away from the practice of
peremptory sentences which "was adopted in the French Penal Code of 1791 and soon
spread in both civil and common-law countries." Tappan, Sentencing Under the Model Penal
Code, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PRO.S. 528, 529 (1958).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss1/1

6

Little: The Law of Sentencing as Public Ceremony
1983]

SENTENCING AS PUBLIC CEREMONY

The Rise of Indeterminate Sentencing
Little time elapsed between the quitting of public executions in England
and the rise of indeterminate sentencing. That is, the practice of sentencing
offenders to open-ended imprisonment terms, defined only by a maximum
statutory term, if any had been set by the legislature, or until a non-judicial
agency deems the prisoners rehabilitated. This latter function established
2
the need for a new bureaucracy, namely parole commissions. 1 The practice
of indeterminate sentencing had its American birth at an 1870 prison conference. 22 The specific product of that conference was a lengthy Declaration
24
of Principles, reaffirmed in 192623 that discredited "vindictive suffering,"
and announced that "the supreme aim of prison discipline is [to protect society
by] the reformation of criminals ... ."- The 1870 principles embraced indeterminate sentencing2 6 and also endorsed a search for answers to the perplexing questions of just how long a prison term ought to be and how inequality in sentences could be avoided. Even then inequality was seen as a
"source of constant irritation among prisoners," causing prison discipline to
27
suffer.
The 1870 principles reveal three important points. First, expiation of sin
as the ground of punishment had lost all official recognition. The new goal of
29
punishment was "treatment" 28 to protect society by "moral regeneration"
21. According to Lindsey, parole began first in the form of foreshortening sentences for
good behavior and work done. Lindsey, supra note 9, at 10. The purpose was to give prison
officials a factor of control. The first indeterminate sentence-parole statute was in New
York in 1877. Id. at 70. By 1922, 44 states, Hawaii and the federal government had parole
systems of some sort and 37 states had some form of indeterminate sentence statute. Four
states had neither. Id. at 69.
22. J. STuTSMAN, supra note 6,at 17-18. This followed a series of American and European
conferences referred to as International Congresses for prison reform begun in Frankfurt in
1846.
23. Id. at 18.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 19.
27. Id. at 24.
28. Id. at 18.
29. Id. at 18-19. It is instructive to report Lindsey's documentation that although nineteenth century European authorities accepted indeterminate sentencing as a correct policy,
they did not accept the idea of reformation. Lindsey, supra note 9, at 58. The European idea
seemed to have been to "lock the bastards up for as long as it takes them to behave." Although the intended effect on an offender's behavior seems to be the same as sought for by
the American desire to reform, the differenc in the two theories would produce real differences
in behavioral consequences even if both were successful in achieving the crime prevention
goal. For example, two persons might leave prison after identical terms of incarceration never
to commit crime again: one "reformed" and the other intimidated. The American reformation ideal has the dear edge on humanitarian grounds, but the European plan has two advantages. One is conceptual: the honest rejection of a humanitarian ideal that one distrusts
is sometimes a very difficult thing to do; this is a variant of what Holmes meant when he said,
"[h]ard cases make bad law." The other is practical: having rejected the ideal, one need not
expend the resources that might otherwise be employed fruitlessly trying to make it work.
Unfortunately, either proving or disproving either theory empirically seems next to impossible.
It seems better to build a system that does not rest mainly upon either of them.
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of the criminal. This notion took hold so rapidly that Jesse 0. Stutsman, an
early twentieth century prison official, could say: "Today, the objective is to
transform the character of the offender by filling him with higher aspiration,
more wholesome thoughts, and better powers of adjustment." 30 This was
deemed to be a salutary departure from the "past" when "[v]indictive punishment was the keynote in the handling of the criminals." 1 By 1925, indeterminate sentencing and parole were embedded in the doctrinal foundation of the
federal criminal code and those of virtually all the states.3 2 Since then, the
conquest has been made even more complete; 33 although, as shall be seen, it
began to regress in the 1970s.
The second important point was the origination of indeterminate sentencing
by people who believed that treating each offender according to his individual
circumstances would produce the "moral regeneration" promised by the new
regime. So great was the ardor of some reformers that they apparently confused the mere acceptance of the practice with the satisfaction of its intended
goals. For example, in 1926 it was reported that indeterminate sentencing
renders "the individualization of treatment more effective,"' 4 a statement that
smacks of undue optimism given the findings of modem studies.
The third important point was the beginning, as early as 1870, of the
search for more appropriate means of allocating "the proper duration of imprisonment." Although specification was deemed difficult even then, the goal
of each sentence was visualized in concrete terms. It was to be "limited only
by satisfactory proofs of reformation. ' 3' 5 Herein lies the genesis of moving the
agency of individual punishments, or treatments, away from the peremptory
choice of legislatures to the discretionary choice, first of judges, and later of
parole commissions and their allies in the helping professions.
This shift of authority is apparently never commented upon in terms of
realignment of political power. In the name of the people, the processes were
moved into closed and secretive prisons and the lives of thousands were handed
30. J. STUTSMAN, supra note 6, at 16.
31. Id. at 14.
32. Lindsey, supra note 9, at 69. See also supra note 20. Lindsey meticulously documents
the growth of both indeterminate sentencing and parole in the United States. Parole may
operate to shorten an otherwise fixed sentenced (for example, by assigning credits for good
behavior or for work done), or to end an indeterminate sentence that otherwise would go on
indefinitely. A determined sentence with parole says to an offender, "[y]ou will be released
on a day certain but may be released earlier, if you persuade us that you are worthy of it."
By contrast, a pure indeterminate sentence says, "[y]ou will remain here just as long as it
takes you to persuade us that you are cured of your criminal ways." A clear difference between them is that a determined sentence with csance of parole envisions that at some point
enough is enough despite the fact that an offender has not conformed his behavior to that
preferred by the authorities. Serving out a pre-set term entitles the offender to liberty
despite what the parole authorities may think of his character. It retains something of the
just deserts notion of the retributive goal of sentencing. Punishing in excess of just deserts
cannot be justified by that theory.
33. Until a few states abolished parole in the 1970's the system had been adopted in
virtually every American jurisdiction. A. VoN HilscH & K. HANRAHAN, THE QursrIoN OF
PAROLE 1, n.1 (1978).
34. J. STUTSMAN, supra note 6, at 27.
35. Id. at 19.
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over to the experts of the cure; but this change was not discussed in terms of
how the body politic perceives the role of punishment. Indeed, prison officialdom of the day was euphoric about the capacity of the helping professions
to bring about unvarnished good. As Stutsman commented: "Modem psychology in union with advanced sociology.., with the mistakes of the past as
a warning and the attainment of modem scientific research as an encouragement . . . undertake and accomplish wonderful deeds . . ... 6 Nobody was
dubious in those days.
It should be reemphasized that Stutsman did not deem these penological
changes to be solely matters of abstract goodness or justice. They were to protect law-abiding people better by more successfully dissuading offenders from
their lawless ways. In 1870 crime was portrayed as a social problem, not as an
expression of evil. One of the conference's principles called for obligatory
education of all children,37 the same notion that had lead an earlier reformer
to opine that "to open a school is to close a prison."3 8 The "new science" of
penology was set off on a so-called humane course of rehabilitation under the
sail of indeterminancy and parole. Because of the concomitant shift away
from openness toward secrecy, the public was lulled into believing it was
doing the civilized thing and that the established goals were being met. No one
noticed that this shift violated the tenet of Cesare Beccaria, the eighteenth
century punishment reform philosopher, that required punishments to be
public as well as "prompt, necessary, the minimum possible in the circumstances, proportionable to the crime, [as] dictated by the laws." 39
WHAT THE INDETERMINATE SFNTENCIN-PAROLE

REoms Dm NOT Do

Tailoring corrective regimes to fit the special circumstances of the offender
instead of the nature of the crime is central to rehabilitation. Although this
approach is rooted in the humanitarian thought of the nineteenth century, it
has been given strong legal support by a number of courts including the
United States Supreme Court which has endorsed rehabilitation and reformation and the notion that "punishment should fit the offender and not merely
the crime." 40 The entire sentencing mess is perhaps reflected in the Court's
36. Id. at 27-28.
37. Id. at 26. "Better to force education upon the people than to force them into prison
to suffer for crimes of which the neglect of education and consequent ignorance have been
the occasion, if not the cause." Id.
38. H. OPPENimizsra, supra note 8, at 243, citing Victor Hugo. Oppenheimer also quotes
Bentham as follows: "In a moral point of view, an ordinary prison is a school in which
wickedness is taught by surer means than can ever be employed for the inculcation of
virtue." Id. at 252.
39.
40.

See Morris, supra note 7, at vii-viii.
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).

The belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal category calls for an
identical punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a particular
offender. This whole country has traveled far from the period in which the death
sentence was an automatic and commonplace result of convictions- even for offenses
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support of individualized sentencing not as a constitutional imperative, about
which it possesses expert knowledge, but as a principle of sentencing policy,
about which it possesses no more competence than the many trial judges who
labor daily to assign proper sentences.
This is not to argue that individualized sentencing is inherently bad. It is
not. Its unspoken premises are that the ability exists to diagnose what ails an
offender, to prescribe a cure, and to provide the facilities and programs needed
to effectuate it. The shortfall is in performance. Without detailed inquiry
into whether any of these assumptions was true, the reformers were content
to permit sentencing to proceed as if they were.41 Much of the sentencing discretion was siphoned away from trial judges, where it traditionally reposed,
to other disciplines and agencies. Under the new regime the judge sentences
an offender to an unspecified term of incarceration not less than the minimum
and not more than the maximum allowed by law. The decision of when to free
the offender, which is the final determination, falls to a parole board. It was
assumed that the expert advice of behavioral specialists would enable parole

today deemed trivial. Today's philosophy of individualizing sentences makes sharp
distinctions for example between first and repeated offenders. Indeterminate sentences
the ultimate termination of which are sometimes decided by nonjudicial agencies have
to a large extent taken the place of old rigidly fixed punishments .... Retribution is
no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation

of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.
Id. at 247 (footnotes omitted).

41.

The fact that the system grew as it did based upon the premise of treatment is

ample proof of this. See J. STUTSMAN, supra note 6. Lindsey says flatly, "[t]he early advocates
of the indeterminate sentence discarded the retributive and deterrent theories of punishment
and justified it solely on the grounds of the protection of society by confining the criminal
until by reformation he shall be judged fit to be released." Lindsey, supra note 9, at 23. Experts
had both to "treat" and to "adjudge" the degree of reformation of the offenders. One com-

mentator critically said, "the non legal expert- psychiatric, psychologic, sociologic, educational, religious, or other- should be 'on tap but not on top.'" Glueck, Predictive Devices
and the Individualization of Justice, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 461, 476 (1958). More scathing
is the criticism of Hakeem:
Psychiatrists have been engaged for a long time in a relentless and extensive campaign
to extend the scope and power of their influence in the administration of justice, in
the disposition of offenders, and in the policies and practices of correctional institutions
and agencies. . . . Some of the more cautious practitioners know full well that
psychiatry does not have knowledge that would be helpful in the administration of
justice. One of these . . .makes the rejoinder to the claim of some psychiatrists that
their success in bringing about changes in the laws of criminal responsibility is due
to the increasing knowledge of human behavior accumulated during the past fifty
years: "But is this why they have succeeded? I think not. They have succeeded rather
because they now possess more social power than they had in the past."
Hakeem, A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to Crime and Correction, 23 Law &
CONTEIP. PROBS. 650, 651, 682 (1958). Hakeem quoted Thomas S. Szasz, who says mental
illness is a myth and, therefore, "we have no enemy we can fight, exorcise, or dispel by 'cure."'
Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness, in PUNISHMNENT AND REHABILrrATION 196 (J. Murphy ed.
1973). Murphy also criticizes the encroachment of the treating professions into the law of
corrections, in Murphy, Criminal Punishment and Psychiatric Fallacies,in id. at 197.
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officials to make decisions based upon the pre-incarceration history of the
offender as well as his performance in jail.
Individualized and indeterminate sentencing is easy to sell in a liberal
culture uneasy about punishing people to begin with, but it is harder to meet
the goals that make them sell. When all is said and done, can these two key
questions be answered satisfactorily: '"'Do these sentencing practices stop the
offender or anyone else from engaging in criminal acts such as the one that
prompted the punishment?" "Do they cure offenders of their criminal pro42
clivities or otherwise better them as members of society?"
I cannot supply an independent answer to these questions and, indeed;
cannot even report in detail on the voluminous evaluative literature. I will
merely sum up a few of the summaries, which is sufficient for these purposes
because most modem commentary points to the same disappointing conclusion:
and-recidivism and deterrence are very poorly served by the system of
43
.,
indeterminate sentences and parole.
My defense of that conclusion begins with what on first blush appears to
be its refutation. To the extent that the goal is to incapacitate offenders by
locking them away from the non-prison public, the system has been quite
successful. Modem American sentencing produces longer terms of incarceration than can be justified by the stated goals.44 In contrast to American
sentences for similar crimes, courts in other western nations assign much shorter

42. One might also inquire as to ancillary goals: Does modem sentencing exploit the
productive energies of offenders? Does modern sentencing make reparation to the victims of
crime? The answer to the latter question surely is, "No." Very little has yet been done on that
score. It is possible that prisoners do a lot of work but not much is written about it. See, e.g.,
Slave Labor, supra note 4, at 97-106. Weiss draws parallels between American chain gangs
and prison forced labor and Nazi slave work camps.
43. The failings of the indeterminate sentencing-parole system have been catalogued
almost ad nauseam. For example, in 1976 Dershowitz reviewed Lindsey's historical summary
and brought it up to date. He summed up the main reaction to the record of performance
when he said, "the overall result of this especially discordant situation has been a glaring
disparity in sentencing." Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 102. Note the shift in emphasis from
Stutsman to Dershowitz - away from the promises to the faults of the system. In Krivseth,
Abolishing Parole: Assuring Fairnessand Certainty in Sentencing, 7 HoFsTaA L. REv. 281, 282
(1979), the author states, "[t]he rehabilitative model, however, has been discredited, and in
practice is no longer the sole or even primary basis for determining lengths of sentences." Von
Hirsh and Hanrahan describe and criticize the system with great care and propose a number
of changes in A. VON HmsH 9- K. HANRAw, supra note 33.
44. See M. FRANLr.r, supra note 3, at 98 (author calls for shorter sentences); Tumbladh;
A Critique of Model Penal Code Sentencing Proposals, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 544, 556
(1958) ("A high proportion of sentences today are too long - twenty-five percent are commitments of ten years or over. Such terms are inconsistent with present correctional knowledge
and experience. They mislead the public as to the dangerousness of most offenders."). See also
Messinger, Introduction to A. voN HmsH & K. HANRAHAN, supra note 33, at xix. One study
has suggested that lengthening sentences is a very costly means of reducing crime, finding
that "for a one percent reduction in crime, prison populations must increase by three to
ten percent.. , " Petersilia & Greenwood, Mandatory Prison Sentences: Their Projected Effects
on Crime and Prison Populations,69 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 604, 615 (1978). According
to the same authors, "a better crime-reduction/prison population trade-off would result
from imprisoning all felons for a short period regardless of prior record ..
" Id.
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because other western nations have always been leery of

reformation as a goal.46 It may seem ironic that overly long sentences are an
artifact of indeterminate sentencing rather than a manifestation of a crueler
sense of retribution. The apparent paradox has been explained as a consequence of political hedging by parole commissions whose job is to cut off indeterminate sentences when reformation takes place.4 7 Because the tools available to predict recidivism are woefully inadequate, 48 parole commissions often
find it politically safer to err on the side of keeping a prisoner locked up than
to worry about what he would do when released. 49 Consequently, while indeterminancy may serve the goal of incapacitation, it may also deprive prisoners
of freedom far longer than necessary, thus thwarting the utilitarian goal of
minimizing suffering.
If incapacitation is a failure because it works too well, what can be said
for the success of scaring others away from the commission of the same crime?
This question boils down to two issues. First, does the criminal justice system
ever actually impose individual sentences for the purposes of deterring other
people? Second, if it does, does that keep other would be law breakers in line?
Almost fifty years ago Professor Livingston Hall noted that "deterrence of
others is not considered [in the judicial sentencing process] unless there is a
conscious drive on a particular crime, which in the cases studied has been reflected in increased penalties set by the legislature and if considered, it is the
controlling factor."50 Since then legislatures have begun to attach high mini45.

See Mannhaim, Comparative Sentencing Practices, 23 LAW &

CONTEMP.

PROBS.

557

(1958).
46.
47.

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
Messinger, supra note 44, at xxvi.

There is no doubt that the situation of parole boards . . . has continued to their
propensity to act as they have. They have been and continue to be under pressure
not to release prisoners until it is "certain" that the prisoners will not commit further
crimes; clearly this is an impossible certainty to achieve. The demand for this kind
of certainty has surely been one of the pressures important in moving boards to delay
specification of a prisoner's parole "date" and thereby his term of imprisonment....
Id. See also Davis, Texas Capital Sentencing Procedures: The Role of the Jury and the Restraining Hand of the Expert, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 300, 303 (1978) (explains why
indeterminacy results in longer prison terms by saying, "mental health professions are
notoriously bad at predicting dangerousness and invariably err on the side of overinclusion.").
48. Pugsley, supra note 10, at 379. "Increasing numbers of citizens are disenchanted with
the unproductive bureaucracy known as 'criminal corrections,' whose claim to 'sure' a captive
Whatever else prisons might do,
population of offenders remains manifestly unfulfilled ....
they do not - because they inherently cannot - make their inhabitants 'better.' " Id.
49. The actual crime preventative effects of incapacitation have only recently begun to be
studied. See

PANEL ON

INCAPACITATION:

RESEARCH ON DETERRENT

ESTIMATING

AND INcAPACrrATIVE EFFECTS DETERRENCE AND

THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS

ON

CRIME RATES

9-10 (A.

Blumstein, J. Cohen & 0. Nagin eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as RESEARCH]. One recent study
shows that merely increasing the length of prison terms has a very small effect on crime rates
and at a very high price. Petersilia & Greenwood, supra note 44, at 604.
50. Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal, 37 COLUM. L. Rv. 763, 782 (Pt. II)
(1937). Professor Hall's purpose was to study the factors that influenced appellate courts to
reduce sentences on appeal in the few states where appellate courts exercised supervision over
sentencing. Hall attempted to discern from the appellate opinions the "court's conception of
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mum mandatory penalties to unpopular crimes such as drug offenses 1 and
the use of firearms in the commission of crimes.5 2 When legislators want to
emphasize general deterrence, the system will emphasize it. 53
But does general deterrence work to reduce crime? When there is a "conscious drive on a particular crime," the answer is an unequivocal yes, at least
where the "crime" is one that many members of the general public might be a
party to, such as driving while intoxicated. It is well documented that shortterm, widely known efforts to threaten would be offenders with the forces of
the law will reduce traffic infraction rates, at least temporarily. 54 By contrast,
with malum in se crimes such as armed robbery that ordinary members of the
general public are not prone to commit, there is genuine doubt that the most
severe punishments are more effective than lesser ones. 55 Moreover, merely inthe purposes which the criminal law is trying to achieve." Id. at 556. He came to these summary
conclusions:
In crimes against the person, it is vengeance, or at least the satisfaction of the
emotional reactions of the community toward the crime, which appears to be the chief
factor determining the length of sentence. In crimes solely against property, the
prospect of recidivism by the individual defendent is more important in determining
his sentence. Deterrence of others is not considered unless there is a conscious drive
on a particular crime, which in the cases studied has been first reflected in increased
penalties set by the legislature, and if considered, it is the controlling factor.
Id. at 782.
51. The growth of flat time sentences is documented in Orlan, From Vengeance to
Vengeance: Sentencing Reform and the Demise of Rehabilitation,7 HoFsTRA L. REv. 29 (1978).

52. Florida, for example, imposes a mandatory three-year term upon "[a]ny person who is
convicted of: ... murder, sexual battery, robbery, burglary [and a string of other offenses] ...
and who had in his possession a 'firearm'...." FLA. STAT. § 775.087(2) (1981). Good time and
gain time parole credits may not reduce that term. Id.
53. It should be observed, however, that the entire criminal corrections system is made
up of many independent parts. Many commentators have warned that when penalties are
too harsh the system rejects the crime. Andenaes puts it this way: "Experience seems to show
that excessively severe penalties may actually reduce the risk of conviction, thereby leading
to results contrary to their purpose. When the penalties are not reasonably attuned to the
gravity of the violation, the public is less inclined to . . . convict." Andenaes, The General
Preventative Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. Ray. 970 (1966). See also F. ZIMRING, supra

note 10, at 62-68. The desired deterrent effect may be washed out by uncontrolled discretion
in a less visible part of the system, which is just another way of driving the decision-making
process underground.
54. British safety "blitzes" under anti-drunk driving laws have provided recent opportunities to study the effects of highly publicized law enforcement campaigns against "crimes" that
members of the nondeviant population might engage in. It was shown and then reshown that
such blitzes do deter, at least temporarily. See Ross, Deterrence Regained: The Cheshire
Constabulary's "Breathalyzer Blitz", 6 J. or LEG. STUD. 241 (1977); Ross, Law, Science and
Accidents: The British Road Safety Act of 1967, 2 J. or LEG. STUD. 1 (1973).

55. Whether the death penalty has marginal deterrence value above that provided by long
term incarceration has been thoroughly studied. Zimring and Hawkins reviewed that work
and concluded that no marginal deterrent value had been proved. F. ZIMRING, supra note 10,
at 189. See also REsEAR H, supra note 49, at 9 ("available studies provide no useful evidence
on the deterrent effect of capital punishment'); LAw REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, MINISTER
OF SUPPLY & SERVS., FEAR OF PUNISHMENT (1976) [hereinafter cited as FEAR OF PUNISHMENT].
Some members of the Supreme Court have relied upon the weak proof of the general
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creasing the severity of penalties for those crimes will have no restraining
effect on the normally law-abiding public.56
Nevertheless, after examining the professional debate about the realities
versus the myths of deterrence, I am left with the lingering belief that deterrence does work sometirmes, at least against rational people. When each
of us pays more attention to his driving upon seeing a traffic officer, he produces proof of a sort. Most of the population toes the line most of the time,
even without much of an enforcement system.-a The difficulty is that the law
breakers among us are much different in their behavior, making it necessary
to address each question independently, if valid conclusions are to be reached.
For example, one might be persuaded that the mere existence of a law and a
penalty is not much of a deterrent against what might called occupational
criminals. It does not follow, however, that such a law cannot deter them
under any circumstance. One scholar recently concluded: "Over all crimes,
across groups, and using several measures of deterrence, it is evident that
certainty is more important than severity of punishment. Thus, from a deterrence perspective, in order to decrease crime one should increase the
certainty of punishment .
5.8.."5,
If this is true, then it is not surprising that
changing from death penalties and peremptory prison terms to indeterminate
sentences and parole had little general deterrent effect upon the law-breaking
population. Those changes did not change perceptions about certainty of
punishment. Something else might.
deterrence theory to support positions against the death penalty. In Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972), Justice Marshall summed up his evaluation as follows: "Despite the fact
that abolitionists have not proved non-deterrence beyond a reasonable doubt, they have
succeeded in showing by clear and convincing evidence that capital punishment is not
necessary as a deterrent to crime in our society. That is all they must do." Id. at 353 (Marshall,
J., concurring).
56. Much of the work in this field centers around the effects of rather harsh Scandinavian
laws against drunk driving. This author reviewed much of this literature in Little, Drinking,
Driving, and the Law, 12 CRIM. Jusr. ABsTRAcTs 261, 278-87 (1980). More recently Ross, one
of the disputants, has reviewed the literature and concluded, "[i]nnovations confined to
manipulation of the severity of the legal punishment, without a concomitant change in its
certainty, produce no effect on the apparent incidence of drinking and driving or its aftermath
in crashes." H. Ross, DETERRING THE DRINKING DRIVER: LEGAL POLICY AND SOCIAL CONTROL 103

(1982).
57. H.

OPPENHEIMER,

supra note 8, at 293.

The function of punishment does not, however, exhaust itself in muzzling wild beasts,
to use Schopenhauer's metaphor. It exercises in no mean degree a moralizing influence
upon the community at large. Let the legislator penalize a line of conduct to which
current morality is but slightly averse, wholly indifferent, or even somewhat favorably
inclined, and the immediate result will be that the vast majority of the citizens will
refrain from the prohibited act, partly because they desire to avoid the sanction, but
partly because in a well-ordered community obedience to the commands of a lawfully
constituted authority is recognized as a binding duty.
Id. This may be so, but the minority that does not obey is illustrated by liquor prohibition.
Teevan put it this way, "[n]ondeviants may avoid crime because it is wrong to do so." Teevan,
Deterrent Effects of Punishment for Breaking and Entering and Theft, in FEAR OF PUNISHMENT, supra note 55, at 139 (emphasis added).
58. Teevan, supra note 57, at 121, 138-39 (emphasis added).
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If whether the indeterminate sentencing reforms diminished crime is
problematic what about stopping crime by reforming prisoners, 9 which, after
all, is the heart of the reforms? Until recently, the validity of the specific deterrence hypothesis, like the validity of the other goals had not been tested by
scientific methods, but some careful studies began to appear in the 1970s
with the disquieting conclusion that "nothing works." More happily, Professor Robert Martinson, the father of the "nothing works" critique, later
concluded that this degree of pessimism was technically incorrect. 60 His revised
conclusion, that "no treatment program now used in criminal justice is inherently either substantially helpful or harmful"61 leaves an opening for hope.
It is possible for treatments to be helpful and, if done improperly, harmful.62
For example, Martinson cautiously suggests that supervised parole release is
better at reducing recidivism than unsupervised release, 63 and he warns that
proposals to abolish supervised parole may be wrong.64
If Martinson is correct, and no one says he is not, the main promise of one
hundred years of rehabilitation has been a hoax. What was thought to reduce
recidivism is unlikely to have done so. Nevertheless, the theory ought not
necessarily be cast aside, as some scholars now conclude, 65 but if it is to be
59. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
60. The work of Professor Robert Martinson and his associates has been most enlightening in this field. One reviewer recently summed up the findings that Martinson's studies "led
them irrevocably to the conclusion that nothing works and that those involved in the criminal
justice system have no idea how to rehabilitate offenders and reduce recidivism." Orland,
supra note 51, at 35.
61.

Martinson, New Findings,New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Re-

form, 7 HoFsTRA L. REV. 243, 254 (1979).
62. Id. at 258.
63. Id. at 257.
64. Id.

65. A number of scholars have called for a return to retribution. See A. VON HmscH,
THE CHoIcE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976); Morris, supra note 3; Pugsley, supra note
6. The von Hirsch publication derived from a study of the Attica prison riots by a Committee
on the Study of Incarceration. Many writers criticize this movement, most on grounds of
humanity or justice. Orland warns that "[ijt would be a profound mistake to legislate rehabilitation out of existence and to substitute a system of sentencing based upon vengeance,
the consequences of which will be to substantially increase time served in United States
prisons." Orland, supra note 51, at 51. LeFrancois argues that there is no basis for measuring
the amount of punishment one deserves, therefore, desert based punishment makes "presumptive sentences appear more just and appropriate than is warranted." LeFrancois, An
Examination of a Desert-Based Presumptive Sentence Schedule, 6 J. OF Canm. JuST. 35, 4445
(1978). Ernest van den Haag is perhaps the only person who would premise sentences only
on deterrence: "Deterrence is the only criterion needed to justify threats and the infliction of
punishment. Deterrence also justifies and determines the length of sentences and their distribution." van den Haag, Punitive Sentences, 7 HorsmA- L. REv. 123, 138 (1978). Oppenheimer
long ago replied to that argument by quoting an English judge who was pronouncing a
death sentence, as follows: "Man, thou art not to be hanged for stealing a horse but that
DOING Jus1cE:

horses may not be stolen." H. OPPFNHmMR, supra note 8, at 236. Justice no longer permits

such extreme penalties. F.
terrence); FEAR

ZIMRING,

OF PUNISHMENT,

supra note 10, at 32-50 (questioning the justice of de-

supra note 55, at 15-17 (same). If one abandons deterrence as

unjust and rehabilitation as unworkable, that leaves only retribution as the major goal of
punishment, which is precisely the point of neo-retributionists.
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retained, it should be changed. The charletan of rehabilitation under the
present system should not be permitted to operate for another hundred years
without exposing what works and when.
It is inescapable that indeterminate sentencing and parole have not satisfied their promises. No additional general deterrence was added to the superseded peremptory system. Rtecidivism rates were not noticeably lower. It is
doubtful that the net sum of human misery has lessened, although admittedly
prisons are no longer as brutal as they were.
WHAT THE ]JNDETERMINATE SENTENCING-PAROLE

RIEFOR

DID Do

If the late nineteenth and twentieth century sentencing reforms have not
met their utilitarian and humane goals, have they had any other demonstrable
effect on criminals and crime? Is it possible that the outcome has been perverse,
actually increasing the length of prison terms, thereby enhancing retribution,
the goal allegedly abandoned?
Little effort has been made to measure how much pain is administered by
one form of punishment as compared to another. The modern scholarly conscience is apparently too queasy to delve into that subject. 6 Moreover, by the
time utilitarian reforms took hold, legitimate official use of brutal physical
abuse was in disfavor and would probably have had no greater expression
under a system of peremptory, fixed-time sentences than under indeterminate
sentences. Nevertheless, even without legitimate physical torture, indeterminate
sentencing is capable of making thousands of imprisoned offenders unhappy,
if not downright miserable, by locking them up for long periods of time. That
is punishment. Modern incarceration may be viler than the mere loss of
liberty, which is probably what most people visualize as the evil of imprisonment. For example, some observers believe that prisons mistreat offendersand make them more, rather than less likely to commit crimes when they

66. It is not too queasy, however, to speculate in the abstract about retribution as a goal.
See supra note 65.

67. It has been said that the fundamental factor of punishment in modem corrections
is loss of freedom. Modern prisons are not pleasant or even safe places to be. The prison riots
of the late 1970's graphically make that point, and a number of writings including Harris &
Dumbaugh, Premise for a Sensible Sentencing Debate: Giving Up Imprisonment, 7 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 417 (1979), document the vile nature of modern prisons. There it is said, "[p]risons
are unsanitary and unsafe. Many institutions regularly are overcrowded, substantially increasing the dangers of prison life. Overcrowding breeds epidemics, strains medical and psychiatric services, and increases emotional tension, hostility, and aggressive behavior, leading
to more frequent outbreaks of violence.... [O]ne of the greatest horrors of being a prisoner is
fear." Id. at 420-23. See also Sonenshein, Book Review, 42 U. Prir. L. REv. 51 (1981) (reviewing
C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1978)). These authors call for incarcerating fewer people for shorter periods of time to make more use of probation, pre-trial intervention and fines. To these points, Weiss adds, "[until we realize that imprisonment serves
neither as a deterrent against crime nor as rehabilitation for the prisoner, that punishment
is always a vengeance - a form of counter-aggression - our prisons will continue to stand as
monuments of futility." Slave Labor, supra note 4, at xxx. See also H. TocH, LIVING IN PRISON
ch. 9 (1977).
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leave than when they entered prison. 6 Still, it cannot be proved that conditions would have been better with fixed-time sentences than with indeterminate ones. Therefore, the question of relative degrees of punishment comes
down to estimating how much more or less prison time has been served under
9
indeterminate sentencing than would have been experienced otherwise.6
No serious attempt to make such a hypothetical measurement has been
made, but some circumstantial evidence bears on the question. Some people
have said that indeterminate sentencing increases the amount of time spent
in incarceration, 70 and American sentences do tend to run longer than
sentences in European countries not subscribing to the rehabilitation goal.71
This permits an inference that indeterminate sentencing has delivered more
punishment than fixed-term sentencing would have. Furthermore, it may be
argued that retributionary peremptory sentences might well deliver less punishment, if the public influenced it. Professor Hall recognized long ago that
the public is more lenient than officialdom in imposing sentences and warned
legislatures not to "shock the sense of justice of the community" 72 by making
statutory sentences too severe. Hall believed the community's sense of justice
often led it to misguided leniency, a condition he would cure by educating
the community "to the point where it will approve the frequent severe sentences
which may be called for" to prevent recurrence of crime.73 If Hall's view about
how the man on the street reacts to the imposition of severe punishment is
correct, then opening the system up to the people would result in dishing out
less punishment - than administered by the officials in the indeterminate
sentence system. More specifically, the people might sometimes think that
punishment would be served by far shorter terms than the rehabilitation experts would deem sufficient. C. S. Lewis expressed this nicely:
The first result of the Humanitarian theory [indeterminate sentencing
and treatment] is ...to substitute for a definite sentence (reflecting to
some extent the community's moral judgment on the degree of ill-desert
involved) an indefinite sentence terminable only by the word of those
experts - and they are not experts in moral theology nor even in the

68. Bentham long ago described prisons as follows: "In a moral point of view, an ordinary
prison is a school in which wickedness is taught by surer means than can ever be employed
for the inculcation of virtue." H. OPPENaEnmER, supra note 8, at 252 (quoting Bentham).
69. See Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 122-23. Although the work discusses the idea that
indeterminate sentencing creates more imprisonment, Dershowitz himself is content to

conclude that "it is difficult to test the hypothesis that legislatures, in general, would impose
harsher fixed sentences than those imposed by the courts and parole boards today." Id. at 123.
One observer notes, however, "that discarding the rehabilitative ideal may in fact mean
abandoning our principal force for humane treatment and may result in less humane treatment of persons confined in correctional institutions." Remington, Book Review, 32 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 656, 659 (1982) (reviewing F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILrrATVE IDEAL: PENAL

POLICY
70.
71.
72.
73.

AND SOCIAL PUR.POSE (1981)).
See Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 122-23.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
Hall, supra note 3, at 783 (pt. 50).
Id. at 782-83.
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Law of Nature - who inflict it. Which of us, 74if he stood in the dock,
would not prefer to be tried by the old system?
Secreting away the sentencing process may have had a harmful effect upon
prisoners, while at the same time reducing criminal corrections to a place of
shadowy, fearful uncertainty in the public mind.
In the minds of the critics, gross disparities in the sentences meted out to
similarly situated offenders is worse than the possibility that indeterminate
sentencing imposes more punishment than intended. 5 It seems nonsense to
say, but one consequence of individualized sentencing was individualized
sentences. Ironically, the concept is applauded but the fact that different
offenders who commit identical crimes receive sentences of differing lengths
is bemoaned. First, seasoned observers noticed 8 and then empirical studies
inferred that the sentencing process in toto is quite capricious." Perhaps each
individual sentence could be justified in isolation, but the aggregate was uncontrolled. Hence, the hand wringing began. Observers steeped in notions of
legal equality cannot stomach inequality. The American public similarly reacts against it as unfair; even when the victim is not a favored class. Because the
equal treatment tenet is generally accepted as a central quality of fairness, disparity bespeaks inequality which bespeaks unfairness which bespeaks bad.
Unfortunately, what appears unfair on its face may not be unfair on more
concrete grounds. Disparity may be a bad rap to pin onto indeterminancy.
After all disparity was one of the ills of peremptory sentencing 8 that prompted
reformers to turn to indeterminancy. Moreover, the trouble with anecdotal
observations is that they may poorly represent what is going on in the main,
and the trouble with statistics is that they convey no information about anything except the exact things measured, the length of sentence, and the nature
of the crime. When the results are compiled statistically, many of the nonquantified community interests and values strongly influencing particular
sentences may be overlooked and, worse yet, assumed not to exist. Factors such
as prior record and extenuation are submerged from view.
I do not contend that all concerns about disparity are wrong. Too many
legal thinkers have suggested that the inequities are truly pernicious, 7 9 and no
74. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 REs JUDICATAE 224, 225-26 (1953).
quoted in Little, Challenges to HumanitarianLegal Approaches for Eliminating the Hazards
of Drunk Alcoholic Drivers, 4 GA. L. Rrv. 251, 263 (1970).
75. The amount of writing about sentencing disparity is massive. Dershowitz summed up
his 1976 review of indeterminate sentencing by saying, "the overall result of this essentially
discordant situation has been a glaring disparity in sentencing." Dershowitz, supra note 9, at
102. See also Glueck, supra note 41, at 462; Tappan, supra note 20, at 533 ("Criticism is ...
directed against the excessive length and differences in duration of imprisonment.').
76. See Seminar & Institute on Disparity of Sentences, 30 F.R.D. 401 (1961) (beginning
of federal judges' worrying about disparity).
77. See infra note 79.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 23-27.
79. For example, a sentencing hypothetical presented to a sample of federal judges
produced a broad spectrum of results. Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 5 (discussing FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER,

THE
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rational, a priori argument in favor of disparities presents itself. On the other
hand, it is inconsistent to support individualized sentencing blindly and
condemn disparity qua disparity.80 What must be condemned are the inappropriate forces producing disparity, bias, prejudice, caprice, and ignorance,
none of which reflects reasoned differences based upon community interests
and values. No one has yet attempted to quantify the weight those factors bear
in producing disparity. Nor would I despair that sentencing patterns in one
state differ measurably from those in another."I These disparities may merely
mirror genuine differences in the interests and values that determine the
severity of sentences. So long as universal values are not infringed, questions of
fairness and propriety should be measured in the context of local values, not
2
those imposed by outsiders.8
New Reforms
Not surprisingly, reformers do not lie quietly by when reforms go awry or
otherwise fail to meet their goals. Rather than admit defeat and retreat, failed
xeformers beget new reforms. Indeterminate sentencing and parole have served
their humanitarian and crime prevention goals poorly, therefore, recent re-

80. This is not to say that if indeterminate sentencing works as planned the consequences
could not be tolerated. I suspect that if the critics of the results of indeterminate sentencing
(and parole) believed that the consequent disparity was a true measure of differences in
the swiftness with which offenders are genuinely rehabilitated, then they would not complain.
The problem is that the reformatory goals of the theories have not been attained.
81. Dershowitz apparently disagrees with this assessment, saying, "[w]hatever explanation
can be given, the single fact is that such vast sentencing variations (as cited between states)
cannot be justified in any rational way." Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 103. The apparent disagreement between us might disappear if more were known about the meaning each of us
assigns to the assessment, "vast sentencing variations."
82. Rummel v. Texas, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), proved that this conclusion meets federal
constitutional standards, despite great disparities in the lengths of sentences imposed for the
same crime. Rummel received a life sentence under a statute that mandatorily imposed that
sentence after the conviction of a third felony. Rummel argued in part that the great disparity
in the penalty imposed by Texas compared to what would have been the penalty in other
states made his punishment "cruel and unusual." Rejecting that plea, the Supreme Court
observed:
Even were we to assume that the statute employed against Rummel was the most
stringent found in the 50 States, that severity hardly would render Rummel's punishment "grossly disproportionate" to his offenses or to the punishment he would have
received in the other States. As Mr. Justice Holmes noted in his dissenting opinion in
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905), our Constitution "is made for people of
fundamentally differing views.. " Until quite recently, Arizona punished as a felony
the theft of any "neat or homed animal," regardless of its value; California considers
the theft of "avocados, olives, citrus or deciduous fruits, nuts and artichokes" particularly reprehensible. In one State theft of $100 will earn the offender a fine or a
short term in jail; in another State it could earn him a sentence of 10 years' imprisonment. Absent a constitutionally imposed uniformity inimical to traditional notions of
federalism, some State will always bear the distinction of treating offenders more
severely than any other State.
Id. at 281-82 (footnotes omitted).
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formers condemn sentencing disparity.8 3 This failure has given rise to a series
of new reforms. First was a call to limit judicial discretion by permitting appellate review of sentences.14 Then came a move to circumscribe the discretion
of parole officials by imposing statutory guidelines to decide when to release
offenders.8 5 More recently have come proposals to eliminate indeterminancy s
and to set sentencing guidelines for judges.8 7
Each of these reforms addresses disparity, but none addresses the basic
questions of stopping crime through general and specific deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation.88 This curious absence may be attributable in part to
the fact that legal thinkers are more comfortable with legal concepts such as
equal protection than they are with penological concepts, and in part to the
fact that tinkering with legal concepts is much cheaper than tinkering with
prison programs. Whatever the reason, none of the proposals divides the purported functions of criminal sentencing into separable parts. Instead, the
literature conveys a picture reminiscent of the story of the six blind men
surrounding the elephant. The composite picture of what they collectively
"see" by touch is quite incredible, but hardly, I surmise, more incredible than
the composite reality the corrections process produces by the six "blind"
agencies that comprise the sentencing system: the legislatures, the enforcement officials, the prosecuting officials, the sentencing officials, the appellate
courts, and the parole boards. Each has a job; each is aware of the existence
of the others; and each has sense of its own mission. What is missing is a
83. Although many references are available, I will mention only the very influential book
by Judge Marvin E. Frankel. See M. FRANKEL, supra note 3. Judge Frankel introduced his
proposal chapter with this statement:
The largely unbridled powers of judges and prison officials stir questions under the
clauses promising that life and liberty will not be denied except by "due process of
law." The crazy quilt of disparities - the wide differences in treatment of defendants
whose situations and crimes look similar and whose divergent sentences are unaccounted for-stirs doubts as to whether the guarantee of the "equal protection of
the laws" is being fulfilled.
Id. at 103. Frankel moved from a legal base to deal with the plight of prisoners as he perceived it. He did not, however, ignore the lack of definition of overall goals and the need
for legislative guidance. Id. at 106-07.
84. See, e.g., id. at 69 8 75.
85. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 15-29.
87. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
88. Judge Frankel envisioned the importance of this when he said, "[t]here should be at
a minimum a basic provision of the criminal code listing and defining the legislatively decreed
purposes or objectives the community has chosen to pursue, for the time being, by means of
criminal sanctions." M. FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 107. This idea has been incorporated into
the statutes of a few states and is part of federally proposed S. 1437, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 10-15
(1977), which provides the following goals for federal criminal statutes: "(I) deter such
conduct; (2) protect the public from persons who engage in such conduct; (3) assure just
punishment for such conduct; (4) promote . . . correction and rehabilitation ..
" Berman,
Sentencing Reform of S. 1437: Will Guidelines Work?, 17 HARv. J. ON LGIS. 98, 107 (1980).
The idea has not yet been taken beyond the definite expression stage to the stage of specifying
which agencies are responsible for which goal.
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synthesizing thread to conform the operation of the parts to a true picture of a
whole that accurately reflects the accepted purposes and goals of sentencing.
The present criminal justice sentencing system works as follows. The legislature specifies the elements of crimes and supplies a sentence that usually
allows a range of discretion to the official applying the sentence.8 9 The legislature presumably reflects community interests and values in accomplishing
this task. Law enforcement has a place. Although it is neither to define crimes
nor specify sentences, police officers have the capacity to nullify a crime by
refusing to charge an offender, which some are prone to do when the severity
of the potential sentence is disproportionate to the perceived culpability of the
wrong. Prosecuting officials possess even more silent discretion. Their capacity
to charge, prosecute and plea bargain are virtually non-reviewableY' Criminal
petit juries also have a say. Although most criminal charges are disposed of by
plea, the jury verdict in litigated cases decides whether an offender will receive
some criminal sanction or none. In most states, however, juries have no say in
sentencing, except for death penalties.91 Trial judges stand at the end of the
line of the judicial process for most convicted offenders. The sentences they
prescribe are rarely reviewed by appellate courts. 92 Nevertheless, under in89. Other writers have described this operation in much more detail. See, e.g., A. VON
HiRscs
& K. HANRAHAN, supra note 33 (describes the parole system in detail); Dershowitz,
supra note 9 (describes the pre-conviction system).
90. According to Zalman, "[p]rosecutorial discretion and its inevitable impact on
sentencing is the greatest barricade to rational, visible, and uniform sentencing, and is by far
more difficult to control or eliminate than judicial or agency sentencing." Zalman, The Rise
and Fall of the Indeterminate Sentence, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 857, 898 (1978). See also A. VON
Hiascn & K. HANRAHAN, supra note 33, at 23 ("It would be extremely difficult to address the
complex and elusive issues of prosecutorial discretion without first attempting to bring some
order into the sentencing and parole system."). Grand juries have at least a formal role in the
process in some jurisdictions but nothing seems to be written about it in this context. Presumably, they are largely controlled by prosecutors.
91. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
92. Writing in 1937, Professor Livingston Hall stated: "The general rule in most jurisdictions is clear: in the absence of a specific statutory grant of power an appellate court will
not reduce a sentence which is within the statutory limits merely because it is, in the judgment of that court, excessive." Hall, supra note 50, at 522. Moreover, "[e]xpress statutory
authority to reduce legal but excessive sentences is not common." Id. See also Richey, Appellate
Review of Sentencing: Recommendation for a Hybrid Approach, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 71, 73
(1978) (federal rule is to the same effect and has been attributed to a fluke in the language of
an 1879 statute and the federal courts' construction of it to deny renewability of sentence).
Notwithstanding this, the Supreme Court has developed certain relief theories in instances
where sentencing courts failed to exercise any discretion at all, for example, always imposing
the same term for a given crime or believing that no discretion existed when it did. See Orrick,
Legal Issues in Structuring Sentencing Discretion, 4 NEW ENG. J. ON PRISON LAW 327, 338-53
(1978). It is somewhat curious that while many reformers complain about disparity, one of the
few bases of appellate review is fixed uniformity. The problem is, of course, that different
judges have different fixed approaches.
The fullness of an offender's rights prior to conviction contrasts starkly with the virtual
absence of rights post-conviction. The trial itself represents a one-on-one highly focused encounter between the defendant and the people. The defendant is entitled to the assistance
of counsel, if need be, and the people are represented by counsel and the resources of the
state. In fairness, the state is restrained by a panoply of constitutional protections, including
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determinate sentencing, a trial judge's sentence is not fixed. Parole commissions
have the final job of deciding when the offender will be released, and those
decisions are even less subject to review than are those of the judges.93
Although indeterminate sentencing virtually swept the field during the
early twentieth century, reformist attempts to introduce appellate review of
sentences failed. It ran afoul of the obdurate nineteenth century rule proscribing review of legislatively fixed sentences.9 4 The rule is usually justified on
grounds that general review would inundate the appellate courts,95 or that
trial courts better reflect community interests and values in sentencing. 96 Whatthe most important presumption of innocence. After conviction, the presumption shifts.
Thereafter, the convicted criminal stands naked before the bar of justice to be punished as the
community sees fit. "After a plea of guilty . . . instead of being clothed with a presumption
of innocence they are naked criminals, hoping for mercy but entitled only to justice." Comment,
Disparity and Discretion in Sentencing: A Proposal for Uniformity, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 323,
364 (1977) (citing People v. Riley, 376 Ill. 364, 368, 33 N.E.2d 872, 875 (1942)).
In refusing to review a sentence within statutory limits, then Judge Potter Stewart, writing
for an appellate court, lamented, "[i]t is an anomaly that a judicial system which has developed so scrupulous a concern for the protection of a criminal defendant throughout every
other stage of the proceedings against him should have so neglected this most important
dimension of fundamental justice" (meaning fair sentencing). Shepard v. United States, 257
F.2d 293, 294 (6th Cir. 1958) (Stewart, J.).
93. According to von Hirsch and Hanrahan, "[ujntil recently, parole boards operated
without any explicit guidelines for release decisions. Decisions were supposedly made on a
case-by-case basis, considering any factors the board deemed 'relevant.'" A. VON HIRSCH & K.
HANRAHAN, supra note 33, at 3. This contributed substantially to sentencing disparity. See
supra note 35 and accompanying text. For a discussion of discretion throughout the system,
see Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DuKE L.J. 651.
94. See supra note 92.
95. Brewster, Appellate Review of Sentences, 40 F.R.D. 79 (1966).
If appellate review of sentences were allowed, the dockets of the appellate courts would
be flooded with even more frivolous appeals than we have now. . . . [T]here would
also be a tremendous burden on trial courts to write sentence reports; and the truth
is that very few sentences, lenient or otherwise, could be justified on paper without
writing a treatise on each case. . . . [T]here would also be a tremendous additional
burden on the already overloaded lawyers appointed to represent indigent defendants
on appeal and on the taxpayers to pay for records for frivolous appeals....
Id. at 86-87. Judge Friendly has also warned of this. See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A
GENERAL VIEW 36 (1973). But see Richey, supra note 92, at 75-80 (author favors such review).
96. I question appellate review when it merely permits appellate judges to substitute
their judgments for those below. I agree with Glueck, who said that such review "at best
could only bring about a superficial uniformity of sentence." Glueck, supra note 41, at 466.
See also Coffee, Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability, Predictability and Equality
in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEo. L.J. 975, 1052 (1978) ("The most careful
recent study of appellate review systems concluded that even when the sentencing court in
good faith tries to explain its reasons, the appellate review process is still normally informed
only by 'intuitive and hence vague Gestalt perceptions.' "). I favor appellate review in an appropriately confined structure. Sentencing judges are given little aid in deciding what goals
they ought to be achieving, and traditional law does not require a sentencing judge to explain
his sentence. "Largely unfettered by limiting standards, and thus having neither occasion
nor meaningful terms for explaining, the judge usually supplies nothing in the way of a
coherent and rational judgment when he informs the defendant of his fate." M. FRANKEL, supra
note 3, at 39. Under present practice there can be no effective review of the quantitative
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ever the reason, appellate review still has not been generally adopted,97 even
though it may be on the verge of wider acceptance by incorporation into
modem general reform measures. 98
Parole discretion has been easier to restrain, perhaps because parole commissions possess less political dout than courts. Federal correctional authorities
began experimenting with parole guidelines in 197299 and have achieved some
aspects of individual sentences beyond assuring that they do not exceed the limits authorized
by statute. Much to the chagrin of many writers, this is the limit of sentencing review in
most states and in the federal courts. An appellate body has little to review if it accepts
the notion that the mere substitution of its unexplained judgment for that of the primary
sentencing official is not an improvement. The appellate judgment would often be different,
but one could hardly say a priori that the difference is for the better, unless one also
accepts the notion that less sentence is better. (This reflects the general notion that sentences
might be reduced on appeal but not raised. See, e.g., Richey, supra note 92, at 71. Permitting
sentences to be increased on appeal would effectively "render illusory the right of appeal
against an unfair sentence." Id. at 86.) Nor is it an improvement for an appellate body merely
to mold sentences to some norm. Suppose, for example, the legislature authorizes a sentence
of from one to five years for a particular offense. If X is sentenced to one year and Y to five
years, an appellate body might be tempted to conform both to what may be the norm for
the offense, say 2.5 years. Such a mechanical movement toward the norm would ameliorate
disparity, but it would erase the judgments about community interests and values made by
the sentencing officials. Not much is to be said in favor of a review process that is so unstructured as to permit virtual de novo consideration of each sentence.
Instead, sentencing should be made a part of the record which would be reviewable with
a few simple points in mind. Did the sentencing agency follow the lawful process? Did it base
its judgment on the factors authorized by the legislature? Was the judgment apparently free
of unfair bias, prejudice and erroneous assumptions? Is the sentence within limits authorized
by the legislature? An affirmative answer to all these inquiries would see the sentence approved.
A negative answer to any one would require resentencing. Fundamental to such review process,
however, is the presence of the underlying sentencing structure outlined above. Its absence
leads either to the system of virtual non-review that typically prevails, or to a shift of the
sentencing decision away from the local community to the more remote appellate level.
97. "Appellate review of the punishment imposed remains the exception rather than
the rule ..
" Comment, supra note 92, at 323. The absence of appellate review continues to
generate controversy and new proposals. See Richey, supra note 92, at 71 & 80-83 (discussion
of ABA approach). Remarkably little writing has been done on the question of whether
the courts' reticence to review sentences is a self-imposed limitation or a fundamental absence
of power. In reviewing the California system, one writer has concluded that "while
sentencing discretion is a judicial power, it is not inherently or expressly derived from the
constitution... . [T]he court does not have the power to ignore valid findings merely for
the sake of exercising sentencing discretion -discretion that is subject to legislative abrogation." Note, The California Judiciary and Mandatory Sentencing: Is the Power to Sentence
Inherent or Inherited?, 11 PAc. L.J. 95, 119 (1979).

98. See generally Martinson, supra note 61 (broader appellate review than now is available).
99. In 1972 the United States Parole Commission began experimenting with parole guidelines to reduce disparity. See generally Krivseth, supra note 43. These guidelines are to be
found in 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.20-.21 (1979); Berman, supra note 88, at 103. The State of Oregon has
created a statutory Advisory Commission on Prison Terms and Parole Standards. A. VON
Hmscn & K. HANRAHAN, supranote 33, at xxvi. The United States Clemency Board has created
a similar model to control discretion in sentencing draft evaders. See Strauss & Baskir,
Controlling Discretion in Sentencing: The Clemency Board as a Working Model, 51 NoTRm
DAam LAw. 919 (1976). According to these writers, failure to control discretion results either

in "an underprotected public or by an overpunished offender." Id. at 945.
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notable success, 100 giving impetus to more far-reaching sentencing guideline
proposals. Even so, the various proposals do not all proceed from the same basic
premises. For example, the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal
Sentencing promotes a system of "presumptive sentences" to be varied only in
the presence of several permissible factors. 101 The Task Force would abandon
indeterminate sentences.1 o2 In returning to peremptory sentencing, this proposal breaks openly with the past and in part joins the neo-retributionist movement.' 0 3 If Oppenheimer was correct in ascribing the ancient retributive goal

to religious rather than secular motives, then in permitting society to vent popular outrage upon offenders openly and honestly, with no pretexts, modem
retributionists are positing a new goal. While this might not appear novel to
lay people, it may be an extremely important theoretical artifact of rejecting
rehabilitation as the proper goal. °4 Perhaps even more important is the power
shift implicit in the presumptive sentencing. It transfers power away from the
hidden parole commissions back to the open legislatures and courts.
Sentencing guidelines recently proposed in Congress contrast sharply to the
Task Force approach. Far from breaking with current practice, they further
encumber the system by setting up commissions to work out detailed
sentencing standards for judgesso5 Indeterminacy would be restrained by imposing both sentencing and parole guidelines and at least one proposal calls
for a broader scope of appellate review of sentencing. 0 6 Although some good
might come from this approach, it does not shift the sentencing power to more
100. The parole guidelines have been successful at least to the extent of resisting various
legal challenges. See Orrick, supra note 92, at 333, n.21. The vast support for sentencing guidelines suggests that this approach is perceived to be beneficial in practical effect. Zalman, supra
note 90, at 861-73 (describes how the guidelines operate to reduce disparity).
101. Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 19-30.
102. Id. at 22. The proposals to drop supervised parole have drawn warning from Professor Martinson that the best anti-recidivism measure might be jettisoned in fse process.
Martinson, supra note 61, at 258.
103. The neo-retributionists include N. Morris, R. Pugsley, and A. von Hirsch. See supra
notes 3,10 & 33.
104. This rejection could reflect a renunciation of the propriety of the goal or, just as
well, despondency about its ever being achieved.
105. Proposed S. 1437 would amend 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 to create a United States
Sentencing Commission that "would be responsible for overseeing imposition of all sentences
and the operation of the U.S. Parol Commission." Berman, supra note 88, at 99. For discussion
of S. 1437, see generally Coffee, supra note 96, at 987-1008; Flaxman, The Hidden Dangers of
Sentencing Guidelines, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 259 (1979); Krivseth, supra note '13; Tyler,
Sentencing Guidelines: Control of Discretion in Federal Sentencing, 7 HOFSrRA L. REv. 11
(1978); Zalman, A Commission Model on Sentencing, 53 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 266 (1977); Zalman,
Making Sentencing Guidelines TW'o,-k: A Response to Professor Coffee, 67 GEo. L.J. 1005 (1979).
For an earlier discussion of sentencing boards, see Hayner, Sentencing By an Administrative
Board, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 477 (1958).
106. S. 204 proposed by Senators Hart and Javits would permit appellate review of
sentences that violate guidelines, and challenges to the guidelines themselves as arbitrary and
capricious. A. VoN HIRscH & K. HANRAHAN, supra note 33, at 113-22. Hall reported that only
a handful of American jurisdictions permitted judicial review of sentences in 1936. Hall,
supra note 50, at 522-23. The Oregon guidelines approach includes appellate review of
sentences that are "cruel, unjust or excessive." A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN, supra note 33,
at 128.
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visible agencies. Indeed, some of the power now possessed by judges would be
siphoned off to the guideline commissions, thus widening the chasm between
the public and corrections.
While I favor some elements of these proposals, they are not being fitted
into the sentencing system in a way that satisfies basic goals. Two things may
account for this. One is that no agreement has been reached as to what the
goals shall be. 0 7 Second, and more important, is that the reformers are being
driven mainly by the perceived inequity in sentencing disparity. Although not
unimportant, this totally fails to address the more important issue of the
estrangement of the public from corrections.
MODEST PROPOSA S

Refurbishing the massive, muld-faceted corrections system would be an
awesome task. Change usually occurs slowly and fitfully, but a good idea
occasionally gets up a head of steam and moves inexorably along even without
proof of its beneficence. But these "good ideas" often do not account for their
costs. 08 For example, indeterminate sentencing proponents did not calculate
the cost of the predictive plan needed to make the individual decisions envisioned by the concept, and they did not calculate the cost of the rehabilitation
program needed to make it work. Consequently, most states assumed that incarceration was synonymous with cure and locked people up to await the
magic reformation. Not merely coincidentally, the process produced the
sentence disparities that caused so much alarm. In light of this, I eschew presenting anything that smacks of a theoretical new sentencing proposal, but do
offer some gentle practical proposals for a better way of looking at the processes. 0
PrescribingSentences
Despite heated dispute about the preference and even legitimacy of various
sentencing goals, they are few in number. Deterrence, rehabilitation (which
I here define to subsume incapacitation) and retribution are most frequently
advanced. Although it is important to ask whether the present system achieves
any of these," it is more important to inquire about process; how are the
107. Frankel expressed the need for agreement on goals and some legislation has adopted
it. See M. FRANKEL, supra note 3. See, e.g., OL- REv. STAT. § 144.775-.790 (1981), discussed in
Zalman, supra note 106, at 1005. The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal
Sentencing also expressed this need and acknowledged that different legislatures might have
different views: "We expect that different legislators and legislatures would have different
value judgments that would yield different quantitative results than those shown in the
model statute." Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 31.
108. This arises in part because much of the writing about punishment is done by
philosophers and "[t]he philosopher's interest in punishment is mainly connected with
questions of justification." Benn, Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION, supra note
7, at 19, reprinted from 7 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA oF PHILOSOPHY 29-35 (N.Y. 1967).
109. I also subscribe to the view that "simplistic approaches be rejected and that we pay
particular attention to the lessons of history ....
Remington, supra note 69, at 660. Fundamentally, history teaches that "out of sight, out of mind" will not do in criminal corrections.
110. See supra notes 49, 54-56 & 60-68 and accompanying text.
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basic goals expressed in the law? And how are they reflected in the agencies
that prescribe sentences? Sentencing theories are much discussed 11' and
practical failures lamented, but scant attention is given to examining whether
these basic elements are designed to achieve the professed goals of sentencing.112
This matter may be examined functionally. The first job is to specify
sentencing goals and prescribe priorities among them. In my judgment, this
falls to the legislatures, whose acts are presumed to express community values
and interests and whose enactments can impose agreed goals uniformly
throughout a jurisdiction.113 I do not propose what the goal should be, but
rather suggest that a legislature might adopt several goals and then devise
a plan that would address the application of each one and the whole.
To illustrate, I will assume the specified goals to be retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence in that order of priority. Ranking is important only if
application of the different goals produces conflict, in which case a tie breaking
rule is required. One tie breaker might be that no goal of less priority may increase the punishment prescribed by a goal of greater priority. For example,
if circumstances called for two years in prison for retribution, one year for rehabilitation, and three years for deterrence, then the sentence could be no
more than two years, as prescribed by the retributive goal of highest priority.
A retributionist would agree to that particular tie breaking rule because
retribution is controlling; but a rehabilitationist would want to see rehabilitation as the controlling goal; and some neo-rehabilitationists would not want
to employ retribution at all except as a "side constraint" on other goals.114
111. Much of the early part of the article discusses the theories. One of the foremost
scholars in the field attempts to bridge practice and theory in Raws, supra note 7, at 83.
112. The notion of proper allocation of functions is not a new one. For example, an
earlier writer said:
In determining that described conduct shall constitute a crime, a legislature makes
necessarily the first and the major decision about the appropriate sanction for a
violation of its direction. For it decides then that community condemnation shall be
visited upon adjudged violators. But there remain hosts of questions about the degree
of the condemnation and the nature of the authorized punishment, or treatment-inconsequence-of-violation.
Entangled with the problems of the appropriate aims to be pursued which are
involved in these questions are problems of the appropriate assignment of powers to
make decisions in carrying out the aims. To what extent should the legislature undertake to give binding directions about treatment which will foreclose the exercise of
any later discretion? To what extent should it depend, instead, upon the judgment
and discretion either of the sentencing court or of the correctional authorities who
will become responsible for defendants after they are sentenced?
Hart, The Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoHs. 401, 425-26 (1958). Hart was
parcelling out the treatment function to several agencies. I deem that to be a mistake. The
proposal here allocates each goal to a proper agency and then permits that agency to do its
job.
113. As to legislative representation of community values and interest, the Supreme
Court has said: "Legislative measures adopted by the people's chosen representatives weigh
heavily in ascertaining contemporary standards of decency." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 294 (1976).
114. Coffee, supra note 96, at 1100. In criticism of Coffee's "egalitarian" proposals, see
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This means that the ultimate punishment could be less than called for by
retribution but never more. Therefore, if the rehabilitative sentence were
three years, the offender would serve only two because of the retributive side
constraint. Although not exhaustive, this demonstrates that a range of alternatives is feasible even with as few as three distinct goals. This highlights what
most sentencing statutes lack: a dear statement of goals; a process for evaluating what it takes to satisfy each goal in each case; stated priorities; and a
scheme for assigning them. Remedying this is a legislative task, and there is
no particular reason for every legislature to adopt the same system. Indeed, it
would be better for the states to generate a number of different schemes for the
purpose of comparison.-15
Given a set of goals, how does one apply them to particular offenders? No
single mechanism will work for each of the three basic goals. For example, the
elements of retribution are not identical to those of rehabilitation, and an
agency competent to administer one might be incompetent as to the other.
Consequently, sentences should be set by aggregating subsentences through a
legislatively prescribed mechanism. Deterrence would be the easiest subsentence
to prescribe.
No matter the contentions that it does not work," 6 general deterrence will
continue to be a central sentencing goal. The intuitive belief that a "message"
can be sent to "scare" would-be law breakers away from criminal activities is
too common to expect otherwise. The central purpose is to affect other people
by example. Consequently, the deterrent subsentence ought to be fixed by
legislatures and invariate in application. The trend toward mandatory minimum sentences illustrates the principle. An example is a recent Florida statute
that mandates a three-year minimum sentence without the possibility of parole,
good-time, or gain-time credit for felonies committed with firearms. 1 7 (It must
be ac.knowledged, however, that public outcry accompanying the enactment
of the statute was vindictive in character. 11 ) The general deterrent goal would
not be served by permitting sentencing agencies to impose lesser sentences on
particular offenders.
General deterrence may be achieved by means other than mandatory
sentences. As previously suggested, the mere outlawing of a particular begenerally Zalman, supra note 105. Coffee also discusses the need of a tie-breaking rule
when different goals make for inconsistent sentencing results. See Coffee, supra note 96, at
1076-77.
115. In an entirely different setting, it was once argued to the Supreme Court that the
states might choose to "go ahead" to implement a general program "in any one of a number
of ways and serve as laboratories for social experimentation." Charles C. Steward Machine
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 555 (1937).
116. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
117. FLA. STAT. § 775.087 (1981). But see James v. Department of Corrections, 424 So. 2d
826, (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1982) (holding that the gain time proscription does not apply).
118. See supra .note 57 and accompanying text. The author of the 1975 introduction to
Oppenheimer's book deemed Oppenheimer's view of this point to be unduly sanguine. "This
article of faith [about the efficacy of a law qua law] has not been borne out by America's past
experience with Prohibition, nor by her present gropings with attempts to reduce 'victimless
crime' nor by modifying citizens' behavior but by removing the legal proscriptions." Einstadter,
Introduction, to H. OPPEaNIuxMm, supra note 8, at vii.
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havior probably has some effect, 119 at least upon regular law-abiding people.
Adding discretion to vary penalties by suspension, parole, pretrial intervention,
or even something more severe adds nothing to deterrence, and should not be
exercised in the guise of producing deterrence. The legislature already has done
that. The purpose of this discretion would be to satisfy other goals, such as
retribution and rehabilitation. Furthermore, Professor Hall's admonition
should be borne in mind in setting mandatory minima. If they are deemed
to be too severe for most offenses, the unrestrained discretion in other parts
of the correction system will neutralize them. Deterrent subsentences should
be thoughtfully and precisely employed; more often than not, not using them
at all might prove most beneficial.
Prescribing retributive subsentences is the second easiest of the three. A
legislature might express the community's sense of retribution by imposing a
mandatory minimum sentence for a particular crime and letting the matter
rest at that, but it would be poor policy to do so. Such a legislative mandate is
more abstract and distant than it needs to be, attenuating community values
and interests and unnecessarily estranging the process from public view, participation, and ultimate approval. The retributive subsentence is exactly the
right place to consider extenuating, mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
Legislative mandates cannot do it. Furthermore, a rigid legislative assignment
of retribution wrongly assumes a uniform view of culpability of a crime despite the fact that the sense of wrong might vary markedly from place to place
within a single state. Drug offenses exemplify this. What a large city might
accept as marginally blameworthy, a rural community might deem totally
depraved, and vice versa. The people of each community ought to have freedom
to express the local sense of community outrage.
Although the people worried about sentencing disparity might disagree, I
suspect the criminal justice system is held in public disrepute largely because the
public's right to express the correct degree of social disapproval has been
arrogated elsewhere. Manifestations of discontent are weirdly contradictory on
the surface but reflect a consistent underlying, unperceived dissatisfaction with
who has the discretion. When statutory penalties are too severe, 20 police officers
do not arrest, prosecutors do not prosecute, and juries do not convict. When
penalties are too mild, the populace is outraged. To satisfy retribution,
offenders ought to pay the price deemed appropriate by the local communities,
despite sentencing disparities that may appear in the aggregate. If disparity
were defined as deviation from the norm of blameworthiness perceived in the
119. That general deterrence was also a goal, however, is borne out by the fact that billboards appear throughout Florida bearing the stark image of a pistol and the succinct statement "three years to life."
120. A very substantial literature has developed to show how outcroppings of discretion
will appear in legal process despite the fact that the letter of the law does not seem to permit
it.
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locality where the crime was committed, and if each sentence were to reflect
21
that norm, then the disparity argument would simply evaporate.'
This leads to the conclusion that discretionary retributive sentencing ought
to be done locally, where the crime was committed or trial held. Judges and
juries are candidates for the job. A legislature might properly impose a mandatory minimum term to express statewide consensus as to minimum and maximum retribution, but local sentiment ought to be permitted a range of
operation. Therefore, the retributive subsentence might be "no less than X
months and not more than Y months," where X would often be zero.
The rehabilitative subsentence is most difficult to prescribe. Despite the
failure of indeterminancy and rehabilitation in practice, the fault has not been
pinned conclusively to theory and the rehabilitationists have not given up.
Consequently, any general model must account for rehabilitation.
The ideal rehabilitative subsentence would incapacitate an offender long
enough to rid him of the tendency to commit crime. Prescribing it would require detailed knowledge about the offender and a suitable rehabilitative program. Legislatures cannot specify the former, and, as to the latter, they can
create only a limited number of options to be molded to particular individuals.
It is also apparent that rehabilitative decisions cannot ordinarily be made
locally. Adducing all the relevant information would be debilitatingly cumbersome and expensive, and local decision makers would seldom be competent to
particularize rehabilitative subsentences. Therefore, they should be assigned
by a centralized agency that could synthesize all program and offender information into a suitable sentence. The decisions might be made prospectively
as each offender enters the system or incrementally as he proceeds through it.
The trouble with this plan is that it describes the discredited system of
indeterminant sentences and parole. Something else must be done. For one
thing, a rehabilitative subsentence of maximum duration might be coupled
to parole in a manner that would permit the actual amount of time served to
be made with maximum information, including the record of prison behavior.
The maximum release date may restrain parole abuse, thereby protecting
prisoners from the proven incompetence and capriciousness of indeterminancy
and parole as they have worked up to now. For example, sentencing guidelines might prescribe a rehabilitative subsentence with a fixed release date that
could be moved up for good performance but not extended in the absence of
22
bad behavior.:
This proposal can be extended. The action of fixed release date rehabilita121.

This is not to maintain that prisoners will be easily persuaded that disparity does

not exist. Because sentence disparities are said to be an important factor in prison unrest, what
the prisoners think is not unimportant. It has been said that "there is nothing that produces
so much discontent and disaffection among prisoners as this inequality of sentences." Messinger,
supra note 44, at xxi. The result of this entire scheme might indeed be to narrow the
amount of disparity, thus actually improving the system on that score. Beyond that, the
purpose is to satisfy legitimate goals of the law abiding community, not to satisfy prisoners.
122. Von Hirsch and Hanrahan refer to the concept of a fixed release date as "the timefix." A. VON HiascH & K. HiRnAN, supra note 33, at 83. The concept is also inherent in the
"presumptive sentence" proposal of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal
Sentencing. See Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 19-29.
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tive subsentences implies that a designated period of incarceration is suitable
to rehabilitate an offender. This appears to assume that incarceration alone
is a reforming force, which almost no one would presently agree to. 1 23 Neverthe-

less, some concrete changes might combine rehabilitation and time-fixed
sentences into a workable program. For example, it might be feasible to develop
a series of rehabilitative curricula24 to be prescribed according to the best fit
between an offender's own circumstances and the content of available curricula.
"Occupational criminals" io whom imprisonment is merely a "cost of doing
business"'125 would be assigned a different curriculum than the criminals of
passion and one-time losers. A key point would be flexibility to permit timefixed sentences of varying durations to be worked into the scheme. The history
of funding of prison reforms suggests that the number and content of the curricula would be limited.
The idea incorporates several points lacking in other proposals. First, it sets
a definite termination date for the rehabilitative subsentence. Second, the
possibility of moving up the release date by "passing" a curriculum would
be an incentive to good performance for many offenders. Third, and perhaps
most important, rehabilitative curricula would force officialdom to concentrate
upon the substance of rehabilitation rather than upon the mere duration of
incarceration. Fourth, sentencing judges could have a hand in initial rehabilitative curricula assignments, leaving to prison authorities the jobs of adjusting
and applying the curricula and evaluating offenders' performances. 1 26 Less
desirable, from the standpoint of visibility, would be an alternative that allowed
123. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. The only thing we can be sure of is that
incarceration incapacitates offenders, and even that conclusion must except in-prison crimes.
124. Late in 1981, Chief Justice Burger made a corrections proposal that addresses some
of these concerns. He suggested that we begin to think of prisons as "factories with fences,
thereby enabling us to reduce the burgeoning cost of incarcerating criminals and forcing
upon them training with economic value in the law abiding work place." Remarks of Warren
E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska
(Dec. 16, 1981). See 49 U.S.L.W. 2522-23 (1981). In a sense, Burger's proposal is one of selfdefense based not upon doctrine but upon common sense and pragmatism. Whether it is
practical to achieve his announced goals remains to be seen. That aside, implementation of
the Burger proposal should help reinstate corrections as a public ceremony. Involving prisoners
in the economic main stream, even in factories with fences, should open what goes on in the
prisons to the regular observation of more members of the general public. This kind of link
could create a climate of opinion that would feed itself back into a change in corrections
policies and practices. Burger's proposal exemplifies one step toward greater openness. My
proposal and that of Burger reinforce each other in that Burger called for more education
for prisoners. The proposal made here provides a modality for implementing it that achieves
the other goals discussed.
FLA. STAT. § 945.135 (1981) antedates Burger's proposal and authorizes the Florida Department of Corrections to "lease" prison industry programs to private non-profit corporations.
This is not yet implemented and older law prohibits the sale of goods manufactured in
prisons. Id. § 945.14.
125. The "three years to life" signboards are one manifestation of this. See supra note
118. Another are the periodic campaigns against drunk driving. See supra notes 54 & 56.
126. Although the educational establishment could be enlisted to help with the former
task, for the sake of objectivity and fairness, the latter function might be assigned to an
independent committee.
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the initial curriculum assignment to be made by a centralized commission.
Finally, without such an approach, the use of remote parole and release commissions will necessarily continue if rehabilitative decisions are to be made on
an individualized basis.
In sum, sentencing ought to reflect the various goals set for it, and
sentencing processes ought to be designed to embue each decision with the
spirit of those goals. To illustrate how a complete sentencing decision might
serve retribution, deterrence, 127 and rehabilitation, suppose that subsentences
in years of incarceration for offenders A, B and C are prescribed as below.

Retribution
Deterrence
Rehabilitation

A
5
0
2

B
2
1
3

C
1
4
2

Assume that the retributive elements were set locally within limits imposed by the legislature; that the mandatory deterrent elements were set by the
legislature; and that the rehabilitative elements were set by a commission.
Given the disparity, it becomes necessary to resolve the differences and assign
the sentence that is appropriate under a tie breaking rule. Under the rule that
would not permit the length of the retributive sentence to be exceeded, A
would serve no more than five years, B two years, and C one year. Another rule
might be that the offender could serve no less time than the longest subsentence.
Then, A would serve five years, B three years, and C four years. Still another
rule might be a version of a side constraint model, e.g., that no offender
would serve longer than the shortest subsentence. Then, A would serve no time,
B one year, and C one year. Deterrence could not be a side constraint unless
legislatures assigned non-zero minima for all offenses, which would hardly be
desirable. Therefore, the side constraint model should be limited to retribution
and rehabilitation.
Fashioning sentences in this manner would force more detailed consideration of what the sentence is supposed to achieve and enhance internal selfregulation. If, for example, experience were to prove that a mandatory deterrent subsentence almost always exceeded retributive and rehabilitative subsentences, legislatures might choose to lighten the deterrent element in
recognition that community values and interests were not being faithfully reflected. Conversely, a legislature might raise a hue and cry about a particular
offense to bring its dangers to the mind of the public. 12 8 By the same token, if
127. The fact that the deterrence subsentence differs for the three indicates that each
offender committed a different offense.
128. Norval Morris concluded: "Predictions of future criminality, it is submitted, are
an unjust basis for imposing or prolonging imprisonment. Despite the weight of authority
supporting the principle of dangerousness, it must be rejected because it pre-supposes a capacity to predict quite beyond our present and foreseeable technical ability." Morris, supra
note 3, at 1167. Another writer has said "mental health professionals are notoriously bad
at predicting dangerousness and invariability err on the side of over inclusion." Davis, supra
note 47, at 303.
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rehabilitative punishments regularly exceeded retributive punishments, a bell
would sound, warning that too much reforming was being done.129 Finally, if
retributive subsentences regularly exceeded rehabilitative subsentences, the
retributive sentencers should be told that their penalties are harsher than
necessary to satisfy the community."30 I would not agree, however, that rehabilitation should ever be a side constraint on retribution. Apart from
statutory maxima and subject always to fundamental restraining precepts, such
as the prohibition against cruel and inhuman punishment, retributive subsentences ought to be guided by community values and interests, rather than
by objective determinations of what it takes to reform the offender.' 3' Otherwise, the estrangement between the community and the experts reappears,
undermining the credibility of the system.
Injecting Community Values and Interests
into the Sentencing Process
The preceding discourse has not specified the local agency to impose
retributive sentences. Most scholars would apparently assign that job to
judges, 32 but many would encumber judicial discretion with sentencing guide129. This could be accomplished by legislatively reducing the maximum rehabilitative
subsentence.
130. Coffee proposed just the opposite: that retribution be a side constraint on rehabilitation. See supra note 114. Coffee's rule protects offenders against indeterminate reformation,
whereas the opposite rule would not. Norval Morris proposed three principles to guide the
decision to imprison:
(1) Parsimony: The least restrictive or least punitive sanction necessary to achieve
defined social purposes should be chosen.
(2) Dangerousness: Prediction of future criminality is an unjust basis for determining that the convicted criminal should be imprisoned.
(3) Desert: No sanction greater than that "deserved" by the last crime or bout
of crimes for which the offender is being sentenced should be imposed.
Morris, supra note 3, at 1162. Morris prescribes no processes for imposing these principles.
131. This accepts at least in part Kant's "moral imperative" to punish evil. See H.
OPPENHEIMER, supra note 8, at 195-203. Norval Morris expressed the same thought when he
concluded that a wife-killer could not be set scot-free, despite the fact that the criminal act
is likely never to be repeated by that person. Morris, supra note 3, at 1175.
132. The literature criticizing jury sentencing carries an unstated presumption that the
judges should do the job. See infra notes 135-40. In criticizing certain aspects of sentencing
commission proposals, Zalman says:
I agree with Professor Coffee that a commission of some sort is a necessary adjunct
to the guidelines mechanism. But there is a dangerous tendency in his article, and
perhaps among some of the "new sentencing bureaucrats," to see the commission as a
generator of sentencing norms. On the contrary, the wisest social policy is to continue
to regard trial judges as the real generators of sentencing norms. The alternative
would be a sterile or narrow formula written by a few who are far from the actual
decisions.
Zalman, supra note 105, at 1020.
I heartily endorse the latter part of Zalman's point. Juries are even more appropriate
to establishing retributive norms than are judges. The main function of a commission
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lines set by legislatures, commissions or even other judges. Although I agree
that assigning the task to trial judges is better than secreting it off to more
remote officials, doing so undermines the capacity of a community to express
its values and interests in retributive sentencing. Trial judges tend to be the
most isolated of local governmental officials and sometimes lose contact with
community sentiment. Moreover, reposing the initial decision with trial judges
raises the sentencing review issue. Appellate courts are so loathe to review
sentences within legislatively imposed limits that, as a practical matter, review
as a matter of right is a dubious reform.1 33 This accounts for the modem move
toward sentencing guidelines which takes sentencing away from judges and
puts it elsewhere.
Permitting juries to make initial retributive sentence assignments would
relieve these difficulties. Although they may be restrained by whatever guidelines legislatures or sentencing commissions impose, jurors speak for the community. 3 4 Furthermore, trial judges might be empowered to invalidate
35
thereby making
sentences reflecting invidious bias or inflamed passions,
permit applicaalso
would
I
process.
the
part
of
integral
an
review
sentencing
that would
stringencies
under
but
all
sentences,
of
review
tion for appellate

should be to maintain and disseminate descriptive statistics of what juries do so as to guide
other juries in their thinking. See infra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 92 & 96.
134. The role of the jury as the "conscience of the community," United States v. Spock,
416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969), is usually expressed in the context of the jury's right to
acquit "technically" guilty defendants, and was most recently invoked in connection with
pleas that the jury be instructed that it has a right to nullify unpopular laws. Wigmore
expressed the need for some leeway between the judge's firm obligation to apply the law
and the jury's obligation to decide fact, as follows:
The whole basis of our general confidence in the judge rests on our experience
We want justice, and we think we
that we can rely on him for the law as it is ....
are going to get it through "the law," and when we do not, we blame "the law."
Now this is where the jury comes in. The jury, in the privacy of its retirement,
adjusts the general rule of law to the justice of the particular case. Thus the odium
of inflexible rules of law is avoided, and popular satisfaction is preserved....
And that flexibility could never be given by judge trial. The judge (as in a
chancery case) must write out his opinion declaring the law and the findings of
fact. He cannot in this public record deviate one jot from those requirements. The
jury, and the secrecy of the jury room, are the indispensable elements in popular

justice.
Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 168, 182 (1972), quoting
Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of a Jury Trial, 12 AM. JuDICAUaE Soc'Y 166 (1929).
Professor Scheflin expressed the thought, as follows:
Inherent in the concept of a lay jury ... is the ability to say no and the knowledge
that it cannot be held against them. The jury serves as an ameliorating force tempering the rigidity of the law, and of the professionals who administer it, with the common
sense realities of the community.
Id. at 192.
135. If such a power were not inherent in the judicial office, then it ought to be supplied
legislatively or by rule of court.
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exclude actual review of most routine cases, thereby not overworking appellate
courts.
Most officials and reformers would probably balk at any jury sentencing proposal. Judges, not juries, did the sentencing at common law.136 The few jury
sentencing jurisdictions run counter to history and the mainstream of modem
practice' 37 and most of the sparse modem writing on jury sentencing condemns
it. 13 s Consequently, this proposal calls for some defending.
Three questions set the defense. Why did those jurisdictions using jury
sentencing depart from the common law norm in the first place? What ills are
attributed to jury sentencing in those jurisdictions? Why do all death penalty
jurisdictions discretionarily employ juries in the life or death decisions?
The logic of my argument is best revealed by answering the last question
first. I do not know why legislatures involve juries in the life or death decision.
The legal literature examines extensively whether the sentencing portion of a
capital trial ought to be separated from the adjudication of guilt, but does not
consider why jury sentencing is used in capital cases and not in others. It thus
comes down to a matter of opinion. My opinion is that legislatures believe that
the people ought to have the say-so when the consequences is death, 1 39 and that
136. One writer traced the jury function back to the Magna Carta and concluded "even
in its embryonic form the jury never had as its function (nor had it ever had as its function)
the delivering of a 'judgment.'" Dickey, The Jury and Trial by One's Peers, 11 W. AUSTL. L.
Rav. 205, 207 (1974). The reason given to explain jury sentencing in some states is "that the
preference for the jury as the instrument of sentencing stems from a colonial distrust of the
judge who served under royal appointment and who at the time of independence exercised
the power to punish." Stubbs, Jury Sentencing in Georgia - Time for a Change, 5 GA. ST.
B.J. 421, 425 (1968). Stubbs noted, however, that while such a reason might have had merit
in Virginia, it had none in Georgia where jury sentencing began only after the colonial era
ended. Id.
137. The list of states that employs jury sentencing in non-capital cases appears to be
waning. As of January 1981, the following states were on the list: Aax. STAT. ANN. § 41-802
(1980); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9.34 (Baldwin 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 926 (West
1951); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2704 (Supp. 1975); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.07 (Vernon
1981); VA. CODE § 19.2-295 (Supp. 1975). A number of states have recently either abolished
or modified jury sentencing in non-capital cases. ALA. CODE § 15-18-22, -40, -41 (1981); GA.
CODE ANN. § 27-2526 (1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3 (Smith-Hurd 1981); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 557.036 (Vernon 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 95-2206 to -2206.10 (1947 & Supp. 1977).
138. See, e.g., S. RuBIN, LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTIONS, 150 (2d ed. 1973); Stubbs, supra
note 136, at 421; Comment, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. Rav. 968, 968-69 (1967).
139. One commentator observed that at the time of his writing all states that have
capital punishment employ juries. Comment, Bifurcating Florida's Capital Trials: Two Steps
Are Better than One, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 127, 128 (1971).
Given the history of jury sentencing one could hardly argue that there is a fundamental
right to have a jury involved in that process. Certainly, in death penalty cases beginning
with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam), the Supreme Court has never
suggested that the Constitution required the involvement of a jury in sentencing. Instead,
the questions have to do with uncontrolled discretion "of judges or juries [to determine]
whether defendants committing these crimes should die or be imprisoned." Id. at 253
(Douglas, J., concurring).
In recent years the most controversial question about jury discretion in criminal cases,
apart from the death cases, has been whether a jury may legitimately find a defendant not
guilty when the law and the facts are quite clearly against him. More pointedly, may a jury
in effect "nullify" an otherwise valid law because the jury holds it to be contrary to some
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they speak more directly through juries than through judges. Moreover, the
say-so of juries is limited to retributive considerations.1 40 In authorizing the
more basic law of the country? It goes without saying that juries may nullify by merely
bringing in an unexplained not guilty verdict. This stems from the jury's right, said to
trace back to Bushell's case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.D. 1670), to bring in an unexplained
general verdict in a criminal case. See Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARv. L.
REv. 582, 583 (1939); Christie, Book Review, Lawful Departures from Legal Rules: "Jury
Nullification" and Legitimated Disobedience, 62 CALiF. L. REv. 1289, 1296 (1974) (reviewing
M. KArnSu & S. KADisH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES FRoa, LEGAL
RuLr.s (1973)). The important question is whether a defendant has the right to have a jury
instructed that it has the legitimate authority to nullify a law and whether a defense lawyer

must be permitted to argue nullification to the jury. This question most recently came up in
this country in connection with the "political activist" trials of the Vietnam War era. Advocates
of this position usually refer to the 1734 seditious libel trial of one John Peter Zenger as
setting precedent for such actions. See, e.g., Kuntsler, Jury Nullification in Conscience Cases,
10 VA. J. OF INT'L L. 71, 72 (1969); Scheflin, supra note 134, at 173-74; Simpson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical View, 54 TEx. L. REv. 488 (1976); Note, Jury
Nullification: The Forgotten Right, 7 NEw ENG. L. REv. 105, 107 (1971); Christie, supra.
The issue was settled for federal courts in Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51,
71-107 (1895), in which the majority, over the blistering dissent of two justices (Gray &
Shims, J.J., dissenting), held that in both criminal and civil cases the jury was bound to
follow the judge's instructions on questions of law. Although there is a considerable body
of case law to the contrary, the Sparf & Hansen position caught hold in the states to such
an extent that by 1939 Professor Mark DeWolfe Howe said: "In all states, except Maryland
and Indiana, the jury, at the present time, is held to have no right to determine questions
of criminal law, and, so far as I am aware, the public and profession seem content to let
the matter rest where it lies." Howe, supra, at 614. Georgia has apparently been added to the
excepted states by virtue of a constitutional provision. See Christie, supra, at 1299 n.
Despite
the latter day call to reverse that view, no progress toward legitimating the law-deciding
role of the jury appeared to be made as a consequence of the activities of the late 1960's and
early 1970's. See, e.g., United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 910 (1970); Kaufman, The Right of Self-Representation and the Power of Jury
Nullification, 28 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 269, 282-86 (1978). Judge Kauflnan later repented of
his judicial view opposing jury nullification when he said, "[w]e can have confidence in the
vitality, common sense, and integrity of our legal principles and of our fellow citizens when
they act as jurors. . . . That confidence should also overcome the fears which lead us to
mask the jury's nullification power." Id. at 288. See generally Comment, Jury Nullification
and the Pro Se Defense: The Impact of Dougherty v. United States, 21 KAN. L. REv. 47
(1972).
140. This statement is partially supported and partially refuted by the only study found
by the author on the subject. The authors of Note, A Study of the California Penalty Jury
in First-Degree Murder Cases, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1297 (1969), attempted to evaluate factors
applied by the jury. Somewhat inconsistent conclusions emerged, as follows:
We found only one pattern followed by the juries in our cases that is even
arguably a retributive standard-that the defendant himself actually killed at least
one victim was an independently significant aggravation. To the extent this standard
might have satisfied an "eye for an eye" attitude of the juries, it served a retributive
purpose. On the other hand, this attribute may have been considered by the juries
as an index of the defendant's dangerousness.
Id. at 1425. The study discredited deterrence and incapacitation as jury goals, and "found
no hard evidence that the juries followed a retributive standard." Id.
No one should be surprised that it is hard to fit the product of jury determinations into
theoretical pigeonholes, when the juries have not been fully instructed as to their tasks. The
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death penalty, legislatures make a major legislative commitment to deterrence
that juries can only attenuate by refusing to apply the penalty as an act of
mercy or revulsion against capital punishment. They can do nothing to enhance general deterrence. Similarly, juries have no rehabilitative role in death
cases, except insofar as jurors might consider susceptibility of rehabilitation as a
factor in its life or death decision. Thus, only retribution remains, which
would subsume decisions to show mercy. From this death penalty analysis, it is
but a small conceptual step to give jurors a retributive role in all criminal
sentencing.
This leads to an inquiry as to why commentators soundly criticize jury
sentencing. Sol Rubin summed it as follows:
Jury sentencing cures none of the ills of sentencing. Compared to judicial sentencing it is further away from equality or uniformity; it cannot develop criteria and it cannot express the rationale of its acts; it
deters the use of suspended sentences and probation. Since it is necessarily
based on less information than a judge has, it is, at best a guess. It is the
source of a variety of ills in judicial administration. 1
With due respect to Rubin, I maintain that these complaints hardly negate
the jury sentencing proposal expressed above. They blithely assume that the
sentencing is to be thrown to the jury as an undifferentiated part of the adjudication of guilt or innocence without instruction as to the permissible goals
of sentencing, and without the special information that might be available
1 42
to a sentencing jury as a result of a presentence investigation.
point also remains that juries lack the competence to make decisions about general deterrence
and rehabilitation on a case by case basis.
141. S. RUBIN, supra note 138, at 150. Presumably some of the "variety of ills" referred
to by Rubin include the following: disparity, evidentiary problems in bringing all relevant
information before the jury, compromising guilt by doubt or indecision, and the lack of
expertise necessary for sentencing beyond the retribution goal. ALA. CRIM. CODE, § 13A-5-1
commentary at 67 (1978). Each of these criticisms falls away under the total plan set forth
in this article.
142. The Constitution does not require a bifurcated trial when a jury sentences, but the
commentators are apparently unanimous in the view that fairness requires it. See generally
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208-20 (1971) (dispensability of bifurcated trial); Note,
1 AM. J. CraM. L. 109 (1972) (rehabilitation and reformation objectives are better served by
bifurcated trials, but the United States Supreme Court found that the fourteenth amendment did not require bifurcation); Comment, supra note 138, at 976-82 (bifurcated procedure necessary for individuality as a controlling factor in setting punishment, and clear
standards necessary for consistent sentencing and notice to defendants of sentencing factors);
Comment, The Bifurcated Trial Procedure and First Degree Murder, 3 SUFFOLK U.L. REv.
628 (1969) (a jury needs additional information to ensure just and fair sentencing, but this
information may prejudice the defendant absent a bifurcated trial). In practice there is a
split among jury sentencing jurisdictions as to whether the jury is to supply the penalty as a
part of its verdict of guilt, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9.84 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 557.036 (Vernon 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 928 (West 1982); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 40-2707 (1982); VA. CODE § 19.2-288 (1982), or whether it is to first make a finding of guilt
and then to assess punishment in a separate proceeding on the question. AR. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-1005 (1980); TEx. CraM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.07 § 2(b) (Vernon 1981); VA. CODE
§ 19.2-264.3(c) (1982).
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My rejoinder is simple. Reform is reform. The goal is not to choose between
bad alternatives, but to produce a superior one. Rubin's objections can be met
by incorporating the following components into a jury sentencing plan. First,
the sentencing phase of the trial should be separated from the question of guilt
and innocence. This would permit post-conviction consideration of evidence
that would not be relevant to the question of guilt, thus not unduly contaminating that determination. Limiting the jury's discretion to retribution
would narrow the scope of the needed additional evidence. Second, the jury
should be explicitly instructed to specify a sentence that satisfies the community's desire for retribution. The jury should also be informed whether,
and to what extent, the sentence might be reduced by good time or other
parole measures and instructed as to the functions of other agencies in specifying the penalty needed to deter criminality in general, to rehabilitate and to
incapacitate the particular offender. 143 Third, the offender should be permitted
to introduce evidence to help the jury make its retributive decision. For
example, statistical evidence describing the distribution of penalties issued by
other juries in like cases should be admissible. 4 4 This evidence should meet
the same tests of admissibility and credibility as any other evidence, and the
states should maintain competent record keeping systems to compile and disseminate it. Finally, the judge should have the power to moderate any jury
45
sentence infected by invidious bias or inflamed passion.
143. There is concern that uninformed juries augment sentences to guard against the
too-early release, in the jury's opinion, of the offender on parole. Dutile, Jury Consideration
of Parole, 18 CArn. U.L. REv. 308 (1969); Note, Jury Discussion of Parole: A Time for Change,
25 BAYLOR L. REv. 674 (1973). The former author outlines five proposals to handle the job
of informing the jury about parole. Dutile, supra at 332-34. The strengths of my proposal
are that the jury is explicitly charged as to its function and that the jury is fully informed
as to how the other functions are performed.
At least some jury sentencing jurisdictions permit judges to reduce sentences imposed by
juries. For example, in Arkansas this power may be exercised if "in the opinion of the court,
the conviction is proper, and the punishment assessed is greater than, under the circumstances
of the case, ought to be inflicted, so that the punishment be not, in any case, reduced below
the limit prescribed by law in such cases." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2310 (1977). In Oklahoma, the
judge must reduce sentences that exceed those allowed by law to the maximum allowed by
law. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 928 (West 1982). In Kentucky, trial judges may reduce jury
sentences incurred for felony convictions that are unduly harsh. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.070
(Bobbs-Merrill 1981).
In Missouri, the statutes authorize a judge to increase a sentence under special circumstances, but are silent as to reductions. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 557.036(3) (Vernon 1982).
144. Nagel & Levy, The Average May Be the Optimum in Determinate Sentencing, 42
U. Prrr. L. Rxv. 583 (1981) (the authors have demonstrated how statistically "average"
sentences are computed.).

145. Numerous historical vignettes confound this unpopularity. One is Jefferson's statement: "Were I called upon to decide, whether the people had best be omitted in the legislative or the judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them out of the legislative.
The execution of the laws is more important than making them." Howe, supra note 138, at
582, citing 3 WoRKs OF THomAs JFXFSON 81-82 (Washington ed. 1854). Howe recounted
another:
It was well-nigh impossible for courts to disregard the people's part in- the execution
of the laws when the foreman of the jury, toughened by his frontier.scepticism, returned
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At first blush, the unpopularity of jury sentencing is somewhat surprising.1 46
After all, this phase of criminal adjudication is akin to the damages phase of
civil litigation. Fashioning a sentence conflates the forward looking requirements of a contracts damage remedy (putting the non-breacher where he would
have been but for the breach = rehabilitative sentence) and the backwardlooking requirements of torts reparation (restoring the status quo ante =
retributive sentence). The sentencing jury's task is arguably no more difficult
than that, especially if the job is limited to retributive sentencing. Furthermore,
the need for close connection with the community is greater in sentencing.
Criminal adjudication is a contest between accused private persons and the
state representing the people; whereas, civil litigation is merely a regulated,
peaceable contest between private parties.
How then, did jury sentencing lose out? Though imperfectly known, the
history of the sentencing is surely different from the history of civil damages.
In the earliest days, conviction was tantamount to the prescription of some invariable punishment with nothing else for the jury to decide . 147 Neither judges
nor juries set the punishments; legislative bodies did. It was exactly this
peremptory sentencing history that indeterminate sentencing was supposed to
foil. Although the advent of indeterminancy would have been the ideal time
to involve juries, the job of pronouncing sentences was so firmly fixed in the
judges that no thought was given to dividing up the new discretionary power.
The few jury sentencing jurisdictions are said to have reacted against the arrogant power exercised by royal judges prior to the Revolution.148 Jury sentencing never swept the country, perhaps because American judges never displayed
149
the same arrogance as did their royal predecessors.
The late nineteenth century movement to indeterminancy transferred power
from the legislatures to the judges. Then, very gingerly, the invention of parole
retransferred much of that power to the parole commissions of the executive
branch. Now, almost a century later, dissatisfaction with that arrangement has
set forces in motion that may again transfer that power elsewhere. Sentencing
and announced to the judge that "the jury want to know whether that ar[sic] what
you told us, when we first went out, was raly [sic] the law, or whether it was only jist
[sic] your notion.
Id. at 582, citing FORD, HISTORy Or

ILLINOIS

84 (1854).

146. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 136.
149. The usual rule in jury sentencing jurisdictions is for the court to do the sentencing
in cases wherein a guilty plea is entered or trial is by the court. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 43-2306 (1977) (if jury fails to agree with punishment, declare the punishment or assess
as authorized by law, then the court will sentence); VA. CODE §§ 19.2-257, -258, -295 (1975)
(when a defendant enters a guilty plea the judge shall hear the case and ascertain the
sentence without jury intervention); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 557.036(1) (Vernon 1982) (upon a
finding of guilt on a verdict or plea the court shall determine the sentence). Nevertheless,
in Tennessee the statutes provided that "[u]pon the pleas of guilty, when the punishment is
confinement in the penitentiary, a jury shall be impaneled to hear the evidence and fix the
time of confinement ..
" TENN. CODE ANN. § 40.2310 (1982), repealed and supplanted by
R. CRIM. PROC. 11, which is not specific to the role of the jury.
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commissions, which might be an arm of any one of the three branches of
government, are presently in favor. In this setting, this proposal is something
new; it would steer to the people, as represented by juries, that part of sentencing that calls for no expert judgment.
Permitting juries to do this job is not without administrative difficulty.
Adding an additional element to jury trials would extend the time required
of jurors and make their task more difficult. Furthermore, offenders who plead
guilty and are tried without jury must be sentenced somehow. 150 The need
to empanel a jury 51 could be avoided by legislatively prescribed retributive
subsentences, but that detracts from the goal of maximally reflecting community interests and values. Arguably, that goal cannot be served if offenders
are permitted to elect to contravene it. Nor is the goal served by permitting
the prosecutor, or the judge, to strike a bargain as to retributive subsentences,
as parties to private litigation often strike bargains about damages. The analogy
to damages in civil litigation does not hold because no one person has the right
or standing to express that bargain for the public. Thus, even in guilty pleas,
one might argue that the defendant should face a jury for retributive sentencing.
Sentencing juries that only impose sentences and have no part in determining guilt or innocence might be an efficient alternative. To make the system
work, offenders could hardly be permitted the same role in selecting sentencing
juries as they have in selecting petit juries.1 52 Because jury sentencing is not
constitutionally required, no one should have a right to participate in the
selection of sentencing jurors, just as no one has a right to participate in selecting grand jurors or sentencing judges. The protected right is to receive due
process of law, which has never meant direct participation in the selection of
the sentencing agency whether it be a judge, a parole commission, or something else. Sentencing juries could serve for fixed terms during which they
would determine retributive subsentences for all offenders.
150. In some jury sentencing jurisdictions a defendant may elect to be sentenced by the
court rather than by a jury. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2705 (1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 557.036(2)
(Vernon 1982). In Texas, the sentence will be assessed by the court unless the defendant
"elects in writing at the time he enters his plea in open court" to be sentenced by the jury
that determines guilt. TEx. CGlM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 87.07, § 2(b) (Vernon 1981). In Tennessee, misdemeanor penalties are assessed by the court unless the defendant makes a reasonable "demand" to be sentenced by the jury. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2704 (1982). In Oklahoma,
"the jury may, and shall upon the request of the defendant assess and declare the punishment in their verdict." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 926 (West 1982).
151. Nevertheless, that need not be so. For example, a judge who accepted a guilty plea
might impose the retributive sentencing (with the concurrence of the offender) unless he determined that the particular offense is so out of the ordinary that it ought to go to a jury.
Such a compromise would not destroy the purpose of jury sentencing. In the worst sense it
would let judges get off the hook in hard cases; but in the best sense it would speed the administration of justice by frankly accounting for the fact that the public expects run-of-themill consequences in run-of-the-mill cases.
152. How the jurors would be selected from the venire is an open question. One method
would permit questioning by the prosecutor and all defense lawyers whose clients would be
sentenced following a non-jury adjudication of guilt, with the power to select the seated
sentencing jurors reposed in the officiating judge. There is no single form for handling such
a matter, but some process should be adopted as a part of the overall plan.
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CONCLUSION

Despite this defense of it, many critics will reject jury sentencing. So much
has been said against it, that the limited, but specific role I have assigned to
it is likely to be ignored. .But the overall plan should not be ignored: the
setting of sentencing goals and priorities; the allocation of subsentencing responsibilities to suitable agencies; and the development of corrective programs
consistent with expressed goals. Any sentencing program designed to fulfill
these principles should help cure the principal faults of the sentencing system,
that goals are often poorly perceived; that they are even more poorly achieved;
and, worst, that modern sentencing produces an estrangement from community
values and interests. Unlike other modern reform proposals, jury sentencing
would reverse that trend. It is one element in a plan to return to sentencing the
quality of public ieremony.
I hasten to add that I do not favor the return of public floggings and beheadings. Still, it should not be overlooked that the public aspect of those
olden practices was what doomed them as legitimate means of punishment.
The blatant brutality was gradually replaced by more innocuous processes
but with far fewer windows for public view. I do not mean to express an
opinion on non-sentencing proposals for getting tough on violent crime,
such as those recently issued by the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent
Crime. 15 3 They simply have nothing to do with sentencing reform.15 4 The main
difficulty is public indifference, believing things are going as they should and
expressing no interest in sentencing and sentences so long as the prisons are
quiet.
Given the correct impetus, the future might see sentencing and sentences
opened up to the public. Whether jury retributive sentencing is a part of it or
not these things might happen: crime may be abated, prisoners may be bettered,
costs may be lessened, and prisoners may be treated more humanely. Even if
none of these works out, it seems likely that the people would at least have a
higher regard for the means they use to execute punishment.
153. See Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime -Final Report, 29 Cr. L. 3131
(Aug. 19, 1981).
154. As to sentencing, the Violent Crime Report merely states: "The Attorney General
should support the enactment into law of the sentencing provisions of the proposed Criminal
Code Reform Act of 1979." Id. at 3134.
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